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ABSTRACT 
There is much debate about how Southeast Asia views China’s ascendance on the 
world stage.  Beijing’s expanding economic, diplomatic, and military influence has 
countries in the region concerned about how China will use its new power and influence. 
Vietnam is particularly concerned, since it shares a border with China and for many 
centuries was under China’s control.  Vietnam’s experience with China may shed some 
light on how Southeast Asia is adapting to China’s rise.   
Today, Vietnam finds itself in a precarious situation.  It shares the same political 
ideology as Beijing and maintains a communist government.  Since 1986, Hanoi has 
adopted aspects of China’s economic development road map and has embarked on a 
program to transform and open its economy to Western markets.  However, its proximity 
and past experience with China makes Vietnam suspicious of China’s rise.  In particular, 
Vietnam fears that China will use its growing power to force Vietnam to accept China’s 
claims to territories along their mutual land border and in the Tonkin Gulf. 
This thesis explores Vietnam’s foreign policy strategy toward China since the 
1970s.  It contends that Vietnam’s foreign policy has shifted from the traditional 
balancing act in the 1970s to one of engagement and soft balancing in the early 1990s.  
Since then, Hanoi has pursued a dual strategy of economic and diplomatic engagement 
with Beijing while simultaneously linking itself economically and diplomatically to other 
states and regional forums to ensure it has options to counter China’s aggressive posture.  
This thesis finds that since the 1990s Vietnam has used a soft balancing strategy of 
diplomatic entanglement and limited security cooperation with various countries to cope 
with China’s growing influence in the region.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
This thesis explores Vietnam’s foreign policy strategy in response to China’s 
rising influence in Southeast Asia.    Specially, the thesis examines Hanoi’s relations with 
Beijing from the 1970s to the early 2000s in order to identify trends or shifts in its 
diplomacy with China.  The research primarily focuses on diplomatic, economic and 
security issues in relations between the two countries.  The thesis provides evidence that 
Vietnam’s strategy toward China has evolved over time from one of traditional balancing 
against China to a soft balancing approach using diplomatic entanglement and limited 
security agreements with various countries and regional institutions to counter China’s 
growing power.   
B. IMPORTANCE 
China’s ascendance on the world stage has many countries concerned about its 
future intentions.  In particular, Southeast Asian countries are acutely aware of Beijing’s 
expanding economic, diplomatic, and military influence. China’s economic growth has 
averaged 9 percent per year over the past fifteen years, while its military budget 
continues to grow at double-digit rates.1  For Southeast Asia, China’s rise brings 
opportunities to increase trade and economic growth but also brings apprehension about 
how Beijing will use its emerging power. In the past two decades, many countries in the 
region have enjoyed unprecedented economic growth.  A majority of the countries have 
improved their standard of living through the pursuit of free market systems and foreign 
direct investment.  However, as Beijing’s economy continues to grow, it competes with 
Southeast Asian countries for foreign direct investment and access to Western markets. 
Moreover, while economic development remains a top priority for many governments in 
the region, China’s proximity to the region and its growing powers have Southeast Asia 
concerned about the prospects for the future. Experts believe the Chinese military will 
                                                 
1Marvine C. Ott,  “Southeast Asia Security Challenges: America’s Response?” Strategic Forum, no. 
222 (October 2006): 5.   http://www.ndu.edu/inss: (accessed January 27, 2007). 
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have the ability to project its forces “beyond China’s coastal periphery within ten to 
twenty years.”2  The question countries in Southeast Asia are asking is will China’s rise 
affect their security and economic growth?   
Southeast Asian nations share a common goal: to maintain their sovereignty and 
prevent the superpowers from dominating the region.  As such, in 1967 the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was created by states in the region to gain a larger 
voice on the international stage.  Since then, “ASEAN’s traditional goal has been to 
prevent any outside power too much influence over any country in the region or region as 
a whole.”3  Prior to the European colonial period, areas in Southeast Asia were 
dominated by ethnic Chinese in terms of economic and trade.  Additionally, certain 
regions, especially what are today Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, were largely under 
China’s sphere of influence.  Following the onset of European colonialism, China’s 
influence sharply diminished.  After colonialism and World War II, the Chinese 
attempted to assist communist movements to gain power in the newly independent 
countries during the Cold War.  Today, many ASEAN nations fear a rising China due in 
part to this historical memory.   
Historically, Vietnam’s relationship with China has fluctuated from full blown 
hostilities to eras of close collaboration.  China ruled Vietnam for approximately 1,000 
years before Vietnam became independent.4  In the post World War II era, Hanoi and 
Beijing maintained a close relationship in the 1950s and 1960s as the Vietnamese were 
fighting France and the United States for independence and unification.  During this time, 
“China sent thousands of advisors to assist Hanoi with economic and military planning.”5  
In the late 1970s the two countries’ relationship deteriorated due to friction caused by the 
Sino-Soviet split.  Hanoi sided with Moscow which caused tension in its relationship to 
                                                 
2 Ott, “Southeast Asia Security Challenges,” 5. 
3 Amitav Acharya, “Will Asia’s Past Be Its Future,” International Security 28, no. 3 (Winter 2003/04): 
153. 
4 Henry J. Kenny, Shadow of the Dragon:  Vietnam’s Continuing Struggle with China and the 
Implication for United States Foreign Policy (Washington, DC:  Brassey’s, 2002), 25. 
5 Rames Amer, “Sino-Vietnamese Relations:  Past, Present and Future,” in Vietnamese Foreign Policy 
in Transition, ed. Carlyle A. Thayer and Ramses Amer (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), 26. 
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Beijing.  In 1979 the two sides fought a war over Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia and 
continued to maintain a shaky relationship throughout the 1980s.  In 1991, Hanoi and 
Beijing once again established normal relations.  
Today, Vietnam finds itself in a precarious situation.  It shares the same political 
ideology as Beijing and maintains a communist government.  Since 1986, Hanoi has 
adopted aspects of China’s economic development road map and has embarked on a 
program to transform and open its economy to Western markets.  However its proximity 
and past conflicts with China makes Vietnam suspicious of China’s rise.   There remain 
unresolved tensions and lingering suspicions between the two countries.  Hanoi and 
Beijing still have territorial disputes ranging from maritime issues in the Gulf of Tonkin 
to conflicting claims of sovereignty over the Spratly and Paracel Islands.  Additionally, 
there is economic competition between the two countries to attract foreign direct 
investment and export western markets.  
There is much debate about how China’s rise has affected Southeast Asia.  
Experts suggest China’s “charm offensive” toward the region since the late 1990s has 
brought about an improvement in relations.  Over the past two decades, Beijing has 
moved to, “…improve China’s image to reduce fears of an aggressive, threatening 
China.”6  Moreover, during testimony before the United States Senate’s Foreign 
Relations Committee in June 2005, Christopher Hill, Assistant Secretary of State for East 
Asia and Pacific Affairs, said, “China’s most dramatic diplomatic, political and economic 
gains of the past few years have been in Southeast Asia.”7  Experts on China suggest 
Beijing’s goal is to slowly wean the region away from United States’ influence and take 
its own action to “increase power and influence to become a regional or global great 
power.”8 Recent public opinion polls indicate that China may be succeeding. They show 
                                                 
6 Michael A. Glosny, “Heading toward a Win-Win Future?  Recent Developments in China’s Policy 
toward Southeast Asia,”  Asian Security 2, no. 1 (2006): 26. 
7 Christopher R. Hill, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs. “Emergence of 
China in the Asia-Pacific:  Economic and Security Consequences for the United States,” Statement before 
United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 7, 2005.  
http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2005/47334.htm  (accessed on March 20, 2007). 
8 Glosny, “Heading toward a Win-Win Future?” 26. 
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that China has gained favorable support, while public opinion of the United States in 
Southeast Asia has dropped since Operation Iraqi Freedom.9 
From a United States foreign policy perspective, “Hanoi is a critical gauge of 
some of the most intractable problems facing Southeast Asia with regards to China.”10  
Among Southeast Asian countries, Vietnam arguably has the longest history and most 
extensive experience of dealing with China.  Vietnam is geographically located in the 
heart of Southeast Asia and near several strategic areas, most notably the South China 
Sea.  It still claims sovereignty, along with China and six other ASEAN countries, over 
many of the Paracel and Spratly Islands.   The South China Sea is an important 
transportation route, through which sea vessels transport over “30 percent of the world’s 
trade and over 50 percent of the world’s energy shipments.”11  This sea corridor is the 
main route for oil shipments and trade for China, Taiwan, South Korea and Japan.   As 
such, many countries in the region are concerned about its potential to be a flash point in 
Asia.  Understanding how a Southeast Asian country responds to a rising China will 
assist United States policy makers in formulating a strategy to ensure peace and 
prosperity in the region.   
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are two main schools of thought on how Southeast Asia views China.  
From the realist point of view, states operate in an anarchic international system and seek 
security and power.  Realists believe states which feel threatened by a stronger country 
have two options: to balance against the stronger side or bandwagon with the stronger 
side.   Balancing in international relations is the proposition that states join or seek 
alliances in order to avoid domination by a stronger power.12   In contrast, bandwagoning 
                                                 
9  Ott, “Southeast Asia Security Challenges,” 5. 
10 Evelyn Goh, “Meeting the China Challenge:  The U.S. in Southeast Asian Regional Security 
Strategies,” The East-West Center, Washington (2005):  6. 
11 Richard Armitage and Randy Shriver, “Trade with Vietnam,” The Washington Times, July 18, 2006: 
19. 
12 Stephen Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security 9, no. 
4 (Spring 1985): 5. 
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is defined as the tendency of states, “to ally with rather than against the dominant side.”13  
One group believes Southeast Asian countries will bandwagon with China, while the 
other suggests that these countries will balance against it.   The bandwagoning camp 
asserts that countries in the region have improved relations with China and have not 
demonstrated any signs of balancing against China.  Moreover, this camp suggests that 
Southeast Asia has developed close and deep economic ties with China and shares 
cultural attachments which will lead to bandwagoning with Beijing in the future.14  In 
contrast, the other group posits that Southeast Asia will eventually balance against a 
rising China. Evidence of this is that ASEAN countries have modernized their military in 
response to Beijing’s emerging powers in the region.15  Moreover, this camp states that 
not all nations have aligned themselves with China with the exception of Burma and 
North Korea.16 The literature on Vietnam’s foreign policy strategy closely mirrors the 
Southeast Asia debate but consists of three main camps:  balancing, bandwagoning and 
hedging.   
1. Balancing 
In Vietnam’s case, realists fear China is attempting to spread its influence into 
Southeast Asia in the form of military, economic and diplomatic maneuvering.  Due to 
Vietnam’s proximity to China, it is threatened by Beijing’s increased powers and its 
future intentions.  In fact, many scholars believe China is attempting to increase its sphere 
of influence in Southeast Asia and slowly wean the region away from U.S. influence.  As 
a result, Vietnam’s political leaders have reservations about China’s growing influence in 
the region.17   
                                                 
13 Walt, “Alliance Formation,” 5. 
14 David C. Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks,” International 
Security 27, no. 4 (2003): 82. 
15 Acharya, “Will Asia’s Past Be Its Future,” 151. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Denny Roy, “Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or Bandwagoning?” Contemporary Southeast 
Asia 27, no. 2 (August 2005): 305. 
 6
Due to Vietnam’s historical memory of China and its current threat perception, 
Vietnam seeks to protect itself from a rising China.  Vietnam balances against China 
through multilateral forums, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN).  This balancing camp believes Hanoi uses ASEAN to “partly transform 
bilateral Sino-Vietnamese disputes into multilateral agenda involving Beijing and 
ASEAN as a group.”18   Moreover, Vietnam has made small gestures and has hinted it is 
willing to cooperate with the United States on possible security cooperation in the region 
to balance China’s influence.19   Vietnamese leaders privately view the United States as a 
stabilizing and balancing force in Southeast Asia.   
2. Bandwagoning  
This camp suggests Vietnam bandwagons with China to appease the stronger side 
and to gain economic incentives from collaboration.  Senior officials in Vietnam’s 
government take notice of China’s ability to “…achieve spectacular [economic] growth 
while keeping a tight lid on political change.”20  Additionally, Vietnam has sought to 
normalize relations with China and does “check” with Beijing before entering any large 
foreign policy decisions.  For example, when Vietnam joined ASEAN in 1995, Hanoi 
made it clear to reporters that Vietnam’s entry into the regional forum should not worry 
China.21  This bandwagonning strategy allows Vietnam to focus on economic 




                                                 
18 Jörn Dosch, “Vietnam’s ASEAN Membership Revisited: Golden Opportunity or Golden Cage?” 
Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 28, no. 2 (2006): 242. 
19 Roy, “Southeast Asia and China,” 307. 
20 Tuong Vu, “Forever Red,” Worth (December 2005). 
21David C. Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks.” International 
Security 27, no. 4 (2003): 81. 
22Alexander Vuving, “Strategy and Evolution of Vietnam’s China Policy:  A Changing Mixture of 
Pathways,” Asian Survey, no. 6 (November/December 2006):  809.  
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3. Hedging Camp 
This particular viewpoint believes Hanoi’s strategy is to “cultivate a middle 
position that forestalls or avoids having to choose one side at the obvious expense of 
another.”23   To illustrate, Vietnam uses economic relations to deepen ties with China and 
multilateral forums such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to 
engage China.  Vietnam is China’s largest trading partner.  Furthermore, the two 
countries have agreed to collaborate on further economic integration in terms of 
Chinese’s foreign aid to Vietnam and an economic corridor from Kunming (China) to 
Hai Phong (Vietnam).24  However, Vietnam continues to pursue relations with the United 
States, India, the European Union, and ASEAN for economic growth and security.   
Overall, this camp believes Hanoi’s plan is to “repair and deepen its relationship 
with China, while simultaneously buttressing this by seeking a great power to 
counterweight Chinese ambition.”25  They argue Hanoi eventually wants to “build up its 
own national strength and resilience and the boosting of its potential internal balancing 
capability.”26   The hedging camp suggests Vietnam walks a very fine line in its strategy 
toward the United States, ASEAN, and China, and makes adjustments depending on its 
national interest.27  Finally, the reason for hedging is that Hanoi cannot get too “cozy” 
with either Washington or Beijing because it makes the other country uncomfortable.28  
Vietnam does not want to be seen as a bulwark for China containment but does want to 
court trade with America’s firms and United States support in security relations in 
Southeast Asia. 
 
                                                 
23 Goh, “Meeting the China Challenge,” 41.  
24 Mark Manyin, “U.S. Vietnam Relations:  Background and Issues for Congress” Updated November 
28, 2006, US Congressional Research Office, 24.  http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33316.pdf  (accessed 
July 12, 2007). 
25 Ibid. 
26 Goh, “Meeting the China Challenge,” 41. 
27 Dosch, “Vietnam’s ASEAN Membership Revisited,” 234-258. 
28 Carl Zissis, “The Surging Vietnamese Economy,” Backgrounder, Council of Foreign Relations, Oct 
30, 2006. http://www.cfr.org/publication/11846/ (accessed January 12, 2007). 
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4. Overall Literature Review 
The literature approaches Vietnamese foreign policy in the traditional sense of 
balance of power.  Additionally, the hedging strategy states that Vietnam will continue to 
stay in the “middle” of balancing and bandwagoning.  However, as China continues to 
rise and gain influence, has Vietnam picked a strategy besides balancing, bandwagoning 
or hedging?       
New academic work in the international relations field suggests states have a 
choice between “hard balancing” and “soft balancing.”  It argues in the post-Cold War 
era states may use varying degrees of balancing and that “hard balancing reflects the 
traditional realist approach to forming and maintaining military alliances to balance a 
strong state or to forestall the rise of a power or threatening states.”29     In contrast, “soft 
balancing involves tacit non-offensive coalition building to neutralize a rising or 
potentially rising threatening power.”30  Moreover, the characteristics of soft balancing 
are: 
Soft balancing involves tacit balancing short of formal alliances.  It occurs 
when states generally develop ententes or limited security understandings 
with one another to balance a potentially threatening state or rising power.  
Soft balancing is often based on limited arms buildup, ad hoc cooperative 
exercises, or collaboration in regional or international institutions; these 
policies may be converted to open hard balancing strategies if and when 
security competition becomes intense and the powerful state becomes 
threatening.31 
 
Moreover, I will apply both T.V. Paul’s and Robert A. Pape’s characteristics of 
soft balancing to isolate and call out the soft balancing techniques Hanoi uses against 
                                                 
29T.V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michel Fortmann, Balance of Power:  Theory and Practice in the 
21st Century  (Stanford, CA:  Stanford University Press, 2004), 14. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid.  
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Beijing.  Pape states that characteristics of soft balancing are territorial denial, entangling 
diplomacy, and economic strengthening.32   
Territorial Denial:  Superior states often benefit from access to the 
territory of third parties as staging areas for ground forces or as transit for 
air and naval forces. Denying access to this territory can reduce the 
superior state’s prospects for victory, such as by increasing the logistical 
problems for superior state or compelling it to fight with air and sea alone, 
constraints that effectively reduce the overall force that a stronger state 
can bring to bear against a weaker one.   
Entangling Diplomacy:  Even strong states do not have complete freedom 
to ignore either the rules or procedures of important international 
organizations or accept diplomatic practices without losing substantial 
support for their objectives.   
Economic Strengthening:  Militarily strong — threatening states that are 
targets of balancing efforts usually derive their military superiority from 
possession of  great economic strength.  One way of balancing effectively, 
at least in the  long run, would be to shift relative economic power in 
favor of the weaker side.  The most obvious way of doing this is through 
regional trading blocs that increase trade and economic growth for 
members while directing trade away  from non-members. If the superior 
state can be excluded from the most important blocs, its overall trade and 
growth rates may suffer over time.   
For the purpose of this thesis, I will narrow down Paul’s characteristic of soft 
balancing as, “limited security understandings to balance a potentially threatening state or 
rising power.”  To summarize, the categories for soft-balancing are:  1) Territorial 
Denial; 2) Entangling Diplomacy; 3) Economic Strengthening; and 4) Limited Security 
Understanding to balance a potentially threatening state or rising power. 
While Vietnam is not in danger of an immediate military attack from China, there 
are areas of contention which could affect the Vietnamese economy and territorial 
sovereignty.  Specifically, with regards to economics, Vietnam does compete with China 
for United States markets and foreign direct investments. Regarding territorial issues, 
China and Vietnam in the 1990s and up to present day have disputes over the land border 
                                                 
32 Robert A. Pape, “Soft Balancing Against the United States,” International Security 30, no. 1 
(Summer 2005):  36. 
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and maritime claims. The thesis will assess whether if Vietnam is using a “soft 
balancing” strategy to deal with China’s rise in Southeast Asia.  
D. OVERVIEW 
This thesis will explore Vietnamese foreign policy from the 1970s to the early 
2000s to investigate whether Hanoi used or is using a “soft balancing” strategy or 
approach with respect to China’s gaining economic, military and diplomatic influence in 
Southeast Asia.    
To build a case, I will use case studies to examine Hanoi’s past strategy in 
diplomatic and economic arenas to comprehend how it deals with Beijing with respect to 
economic development, security related issues such a maritime and land border disputes.   
The case studies will concentrate on Vietnam’s economic and diplomatic maneuvers to 
analyze any trends in policies against China.   
The remainder of this thesis is divided into three main chapters.  In Chapter II, I 
examine Vietnam’s approach to China from the 1970s through 1991.  This was a unique 
era in their relationship because Vietnam first collaborated with China to unite its country 
and then both sides experienced tension due a competition for power and influence in 
Southeast Asia.   Next, in Chapter III, I explore Vietnam’s economic strategy in the wake 
of China’s economic rise.  In this period, Vietnam was able to develop economic and 
diplomatic relations with other countries to enhance its position against China.  This 
strategy allowed Vietnam to link its economy to other countries which prevented an over 
reliance on China for economic growth.  From there, Chapter IV will explore Vietnam’s 
actions concerning areas of contention with regards to its land border and maritime 
disputes with China.  This section will illustrate how Hanoi has used economic and 
diplomatic linkages to softly balance China through diplomatic entanglement and limited 
security cooperation with various countries and regional forums.  Finally, the last chapter 
provides recommendations for U.S. policy toward Vietnam due to the fact Hanoi engages 
in a soft balancing strategy against China. 
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II. VIETNAM-CHINA RELATIONS 1970 TO 1990 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine Vietnam’s foreign policy strategy vis-a- 
vis the People’s Republic of China (PRC).  The chapter focuses on the diplomatic and 
political fronts of national security and not on the economic or security aspects.  It 
examines Hanoi’s strategy over three decades, the 1970s through the 1990s.   
The section shows that Vietnam’s foreign policy from the 1970s up until the 
1990s was based on a traditional balancing act against China to ensure its sovereignty and 
independence.  It reveals that Vietnam balanced against the China threat using the Soviet 
Union to counter China’s aggressive behavior.  However, in the 1980s as the Soviet 
Union shifted its foreign policy, Vietnam realized it would lose a superpower sponsor and 
sought to make peace with China. 
B. BRIEF HISTORY PRIOR TO 1970 
Interaction between Vietnam and China began over 2,000 years ago.  Throughout 
their histories, the countries have experienced eras ranging from full cooperation and 
friendship to outright hostilities and war.  China, the dominant country in terms of 
population, culture, military power and economic clout has exercised its might over its 
smaller neighbor, Vietnam.  The Vietnamese were under China’s sphere of influence for 
over 1,000 years up to the tenth century, C.E.  Since then, relations between Vietnam and 
China have continued to oscillate from periods of relative peace to periods of friction and 
open conflict.  In fact, China invaded Vietnam in the thirteenth, fifteenth and eighteenth 
centuries.  Scholars view only a small time period during China’s century of humiliation 
and Vietnam’s colonization by the French as a point in which Vietnam did not concern 
itself about the China threat.33  At the end of the European colonial era in Asia and in 
certain periods of the Cold War, Vietnam and China collaborated to gain independence 
from Western Powers.   
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During the U.S. involvement in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, China provided 
economic assistance and military aid to its communist comrades, the North Vietnamese.  
The China threat of joining the war on the side of North Vietnam in the 1960s served as 
deterrence and “assured (North) Vietnam that there would be limits to U.S. escalation.”34   
In this period the relationship was described by the PRC as close as “lips and teeth.”  
However, in the 1970s relations between Vietnam and China began to break down.  The 
China threat and its aggression once again galvanized the country and as one scholar 
states, “Vietnamese fear of being overwhelmed by the colossus to the north drove the 
people of Vietnam to define themselves as a people and a nation.”35   
C. VIETNAM AND CHINA RELATIONS 1970S—EVOLUTION FROM 
FRIENDSHIP TO ENEMIES  
The section is divided into three main parts.  The first part will discuss China’s 
action toward Vietnam in the mid to late 1970s.  The next section will look at the 
international environment which shaped the countries behavior.  Finally, the last section 
concludes with how Hanoi’s response to the international scene, its actions toward ethnic 
Chinese and its invasion of Cambodia caused a brief war with China. 
1. Sino and Vietnamese Interaction 
An examination of the 1970s reveals a turning point in Vietnam’s relations with 
China.  The decade began with close collaboration as China assisted its fellow communist 
comrade, North Vietnam, with fighting “imperialist aggression” from the United States in 
South Vietnam.  Once the United States, South Vietnam and North Vietnam signed the 
Paris Peace Agreement in 1973, relations between the China and North Vietnam began to 
diverge.     
China attempted to take a leadership role in Indo-China upon the signing of the 
Paris Peace Agreement. This ran contrary to Vietnam’s own ambition and expectations of 
its own leadership in Indochina.  The Vietnamese stated that “…Chinese leaders had 
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advised them to diminish the level of the fighting in the South for a couple of years, 
advice perceived as aiming to keep Vietnam divided.”36  At approximately the same time 
China requested restraint from Hanoi, Beijing launched a military operation in January of 
1974 and seized control of the Paracel and Spratly archipelagos in the South China Sea 
from the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam).37  Both China and Vietnam (North and 
South) had claimed the islands for centuries.  Moreover, to amplify the situation, over 
300 border incidents occurred between North Vietnam and China from 1974 through 
1975.38   
China’s actions in the South China Sea, the border clashes, and the PRC’s request 
for Vietnam to show restraint and wait to unify South Vietnam with the North began to 
cause friction between the countries.  But, Vietnam continued to ally itself with China 
and cooperate because it required economic assistance and security. 
2. International Environment 
In the 1970s, Vietnam found itself in the middle of a dispute between the Soviet 
Union and China which spilled over into Southeast Asia.  The United States retrenchment 
from Southeast Asia after the fall of Saigon in 1975 caused a power vacuum in the region 
with China and the Soviet Union looking to fill the void.  As Laos and Cambodia fell to 
communist regimes, the question was who would lead the communist nations in the 
region, the Soviet Union or China?  Who would have Vietnam’s allegiance?  
Against the backdrop of the power struggle and competition between Moscow 
and Beijing for Hanoi’s allegiance, relations between Vietnam and China were already 
strained due to Beijing’s “tilt” toward Washington during the early portion of the 1970s.  
This severely impacted Vietnam’s relations with China as Beijing approached Vietnam’s 
enemy, the United States “with a policy of détente.”39  China’s invitation to host 
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President Nixon and the eventual “Shanghai Communiqué” in 1972 following the visit 
caused resentment and suspicion from Hanoi.   
Meanwhile, the Soviets courted Vietnam to fill the power vacuum in Southeast 
Asia and to “encircle” China through alliances near Beijing’s northern and southern 
zones.40  China was aware of Soviet ambitions and warned Hanoi about its friendship 
toward Moscow.  China’s news agency described Russia as, “a superpower which carries 
the signboard of ‘socialism’ betrays the cause of revolutionary struggle…and pursues the 
imperialist policy of expansion.”41   
As previously stated, Vietnam sought to exert its leadership in Indo-China after 
defeating France and the United States.  However, China wanted Vietnam to play the 
junior partner in Indo-China and kowtow to Beijing.  Hanoi was suspicious of Beijing’s 
“partnership” with Washington and chose to lean toward Moscow.42  Moreover, Vietnam 
perceived a weakness in China in the mid-to late 1970s.  Beijing was recovering from the 
Cultural Revolution and its economy was in chaos.43  Moreover, when China, under 
Deng Xiaoping, adopted economic reforms which included tenets of capitalism, the 
Vietnamese leaders “…reacted with disdain for the path chose by China”44  The reasons 
were clear, Hanoi had just fought two successive wars with “western” imperialists.  As 
Vietnam viewed a weakness in China, it attempted to gain influence in the region. 
Vietnam made positive strides with its relations with Laos in mid 1976 which 
raised eyebrows in Beijing.  The two countries signed economic arrangements to 
facilitate trade.  Also, Vietnam provided Laos with the use of its port facilities in Danang 
for imports and exports of goods.  This was crucial to Laos since Thailand cut off the 
Thai-Lao border.   Additionally, in 1976 China estimated that there were 30,000 
Vietnamese troops in Laos which suggested military cooperation.45 It was at this point 
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where China became concerned about Soviet assistance to Vietnam and announced it 
would turn off economic aid to Vietnam in 1977.  The reason China provided was it had 
to use the resources for its domestic agenda.  Moreover, China stated Vietnam had not 
paid back insisting loans.   
After China turned off economic aid to Vietnam in 1977, the country singed on to 
the Soviet-led Council for Mutual Economic Assistance in 1978, further tilting toward 
Russia.  This led to a series of diplomatic jabs between Vietnam and China.  However, 
one main event which heightened tensions was Hanoi’s treatment of ethnic Chinese in 
Vietnam. 
3. Vietnam Actions with Ethnic Chinese and the Invasion of Cambodia  
In 1977, approximately two years after unification, Vietnam attempted reforms to 
abolish private business and implement socialism.  This policy especially disrupted the 
lives of approximately two million ethnic Chinese in Vietnam who were heavily involved 
in economic institutions.46  An example of what occurred in the country is Vietnamese 
army personnel subsequently entered private business in southern Vietnam, taking 
inventory of the premises, and on March 23 (1978) Hanoi announced, ‘effective 
immediately’, the end of private trade and business in southern Vietnam.47  Additionally, 
the Vietnamese forced ethnic Chinese to relocate to the country side and become farmers.  
Moreover, on April 1978 ethnic Chinese were forced to flee Vietnam from the north into 
southern China.  Beijing was occupied with domestic strife in the wake of the failed 
culture revolution and now was forced to absorb 260,000 refugees (230,000 ethnic 
Chinese) crossing its southern border from Vietnam.48 Apparently, “The  
Vietnamese explained that the campaign that led to the mass exodus of ethnic Chinese 
was part of a ‘class struggle’ and suggested that the fight had been encouraged by 
China.”49   
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The PRC attempted to show leadership and stepped in to negotiate and privately 
intimidate Vietnam over the issue of ethnic Chinese.  Vietnam brushed aside China’s 
concern.  As China protested, the Vietnamese viewed this as an attempt to involve itself 
in the internal affairs of Vietnam.50  Beijing further viewed actions by Hanoi as the 
“USSR encouraged Vietnam’s ‘persecution’ of ethnic Chinese and its refusal to bow to 
China’s demands.”51 Beijing sent passengers ships to “bring home persecuted 
Chinese.”52  However, the ships returned empty as the two countries did not agree on 
where the ships could enter Vietnam.  China eventually responded with the public threat 
of military action.53  The harsh rhetoric backed by military threat would lead Vietnam to 
fully balance against China with Russia.   
Due to China’s looming threat and past hostilities, Vietnam signed a 25 year 
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union in November 1978.54  This 
treaty allowed the Soviet Union’s military access to airports and particularly the seaport 
in Cam Ranh Bay. Additionally, it provided Hanoi with economic aid and military 
cooperation to counter the China threat.  The treaty also implied Soviet support and 
intervention on behalf of Vietnam should China interfere with its plans to invade 
Cambodia.55  Events in Cambodia in 1978 would spark a border war between Vietnam 
and China. 
In 1975 the Vietnamese felt slighted about Cambodia’s re-capturing the lower 
Mekong delta from the newly united Vietnam.56  However, at the time Vietnam was not 
in a position take action.  But, in 1977 there were additional concerns as the “Khmer 
Rouge attacks across the Vietnamese frontier were jeopardizing crucial rural resettlement 
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and development programs.”57  Moreover, in 1978, repeated border clashes between the 
two sides continued.  As Sino-Vietnam relations experienced tensions and fragmentation 
due to several factors mentioned earlier, Beijing’s relations with Cambodia were 
excellent.  As China’s aid to Vietnam dwindled to zero, its economic and military aid to 
Cambodia began to rise.  Beijing now viewed Cambodia as the bulwark of defense 
against the Vietnam-Soviet alliance.58   
Vietnam cited the repeated Cambodian incursions into its territory as the reason 
for taking offensive action which infuriated China. Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 
December 25, 1978, and quickly overthrew the Khmer Rouge and replaced it with the 
Heng Samrin government by early 1979.  China began its whirlwind of activities to 
isolate Vietnam.  Beijing used its power on the United Nations Security Council to 
condemn Hanoi’s attack on Phnom Penh.  On the international stage, China lashed out 
with harsh rhetoric about the Vietnamese invasion.  China attempted to rally support on 
the international stage and Southeast Asia.  Accordingly:  
Beijing contended that the Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea and its 
domination of  Laos was not an ‘isolated event’ or ‘local issue’ since it not 
only revealed Hanoi’s ambition to dominate all of Indochina but also 
represented an important component of the Soviet attempt to further its 
strategy of seeking world hegemony.59 
Beijing was concerned about the Soviet-Vietnam alliance and its attempt to 
encircle China via Cambodia.  As a result, China decided to take military action.  On 
February 17, 1979, the Chinese Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) moved into Vietnam to 
“teach Vietnam a lesson” and secure its withdrawal from Cambodia.   The PLA sent 
approximately 80,000 troops across the border at 26 different points into Vietnam.60  The 
Vietnamese engaged the PLA with approximately 75,000 to 100,000 reserve troops.61  
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The PLA captured five of the six border provinces in north Vietnam.  The PLA and 
Vietnamese forces suffered serious loses for such a short engagement (60 days).  It is 
estimated 25,000 Chinese and 20,000 Vietnamese died in the conflict.62  After China felt 
the Vietnamese had learned their lesson, it pulled its troops out of northern Vietnam.  
However, Vietnam was never in danger of falling to Chinese forces.  Military experts 
stressed had China continued with the war, it would have lost more soldiers and victory 
over Vietnam was not a given.63   
For the remainder of 1979, both Vietnam and China engaged in a war of words in 
the diplomatic arena.  Vietnam called China, “the great Han expansionist” and published 
its “China White Paper” which accused Beijing of historical animosity toward Vietnam 
and a hindrance to the countries’ unification.64  Vietnam remained in Cambodia for 
another 10 years.  During Vietnam’s occupation, China provided military aid to the 
Khmer Rouge, continued actions to diplomatically isolate Vietnam and pressured Hanoi 
with the threat of military force. 
Vietnam’s foreign policy in the 1970s was based on realpolitik.  Hanoi balanced 
against external threats to ensure its security and independence.  Vietnam used China to 
balance against a stronger country, the United States in the early 1970s. Upon American 
withdrawal, China wanted to re-establish its historical power in the region and on 
Vietnam.  The PRC’s actions directly against Vietnam awakened historical distrust and 
animosity (South China Sea, border clashes).  Moreover, China’s tilt toward the United 
States concerned Vietnam.  Vietnamese leaders saw the hypocrisy in Chinese foreign 
policy when Beijing warned Hanoi about its relations with Russia while it (China) 
pursued détente with the United States.   Finally, China’s threat of military intervention 
with respect to the Vietnam’s treatment of ethnic Chinese and the cut-off of economic 
aided forced Vietnam to ensure its survival by siding with Russia to balance the China 
threat.       
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D. THE 1980S—HOSTILITIES, STALEMATE AND WARMING OF 
RELATIONS 
The period from 1980 to 1986 was marked by stalemate and continued hostility 
between Vietnam and China.  In this period, Vietnam continued to balance Russia against 
China.  In 1986, however, Vietnam established peaceful ties with China.  The reasons for 
Hanoi’s shift were Moscow’s warming relations with Beijing and Vietnam’s own 
faltering economy.   
1. Stalemate — Chinese and Vietnam Actions 1980–1986 
China pursued a strategy of “bleeding Vietnam white” in terms of international 
isolation and threat of military force.  The two sides did not have official diplomatic 
contact for close to decade.  The PRC continued to pressure Vietnam with occasional 
volleys of artillery fire and border incursions, which forced Hanoi to maintain a sizeable 
force in the northern Vietnam.  Additionally, the PRC used its international clout with the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the United States and the United 
Nations to isolate Vietnam.  The main reason was China wanted Vietnam out of 
Cambodia.  It believed the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance was an attempt to encircle China.  
In contrast, Hanoi viewed Beijing’s support of the Khmer Rouge as an attempt by China 
to encircle Vietnam.65 
From 1980 until 1986, Vietnam attempted to consolidate power in Indochina and 
outlast China.  In 1982, the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) referred to China as 
“the direct enemy of the Vietnamese people.”  Hanoi launched offensives in Cambodia 
and into areas of Thailand to eradicate the Chinese backed Khmer Rouge.  This caused 
more refugees flowing into Thailand which did not help Vietnam’s public image.  
However, Vietnam was not deterred by the negative publicity and viewed Cambodia’s 
mission to eradicate the Chinese-backed Khmer Rouge as critical to its national security.  
As General Le Duc Anh from the Vietnamese Army stated: 
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Experience over more than half a century on the Inochinese peninsula 
shows that to the Japanese fascist, French colonialist, and U.S. imperialist 
as well as to the Chinese expansionist and hegemonist at present, 
Indochina has always  remained a target of aggression and a unified 
battleground in their plots of  aggression.66 
Hanoi sent delegations to member states of ASEAN to counter Chinese rhetoric 
and seek their support for its action in Cambodia.  Vietnam insisted on working with 
ASEAN to solve the Cambodia problem and played on the fears of China’s historical role 
in Southeast Asia.  However, despite Vietnam’s efforts, its diplomacy fell short.  Vietnam 
continued to be ostracized on the international stage until it solved the Cambodia issue.  
Moreover, Vietnam was “isolated” from not only Southeast Asia but from East Asian 
countries such as (Japan/Taiwan) and Europe due to the United States led trade embargo 
against Hanoi.  Cambodia became an Achilles heel for Hanoi and it could not break out 
of the isolation.  However, the deadlock broke due to events at the geopolitical level and 
Hanoi’s internal domestic problems would force the country to change its foreign policy 
with China. 
2. Vietnam Socio-Economic Failure 
During the mid 1980s there were two main causes which forced Vietnam to 
change its foreign policy strategy:  the warming of the Sino-Soviet relationship and 
Vietnam’s dismal socio-economic situation.  I will begin with Moscow and China 
relations influencing Vietnam. 
In the mid 1980s Moscow sought to improve relations with Beijing.  The PRC 
agreed but requested an end to Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia first.  Russia quickly 
“nudged” Vietnam to solve the Cambodia issue with China.  Additionally, to amplify 
Vietnam’s predicament, the Soviet Union and eastern bloc states began to slowly 
diminish economic aid to Vietnam in the mid 1980s.  This affected Hanoi because during 
the period of Soviet alliance, CMEA economic assistance “accounted for 38 percent of 
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Vietnam’s total annual budget.”67  Moreover, Cambodia became an economic drain on 
the state resources as Hanoi had to maintain a sizable garrison in Cambodia. 
In 1986 Vietnam realized its economy was failing.  Years of war with the United 
States, the brief war with China, the ongoing turmoil with Cambodia and the international 
isolation began to take its toll on the economy.  The Soviet Union adopted economic plan 
failed and could not lift the country out of its severe socio-economic problems.  
Economic growth was actually negative in some years and inflation was at 774.7% in 
1986.68   Even more critical, the country could not even feed itself and had to import 
“hundreds of tons of rice” through 1988.69  Vietnam had to change course in its foreign 
policy and could not outlast China.  It realized must join the international community and 
in this regard, China did “bleed Vietnam White.”  
Vietnam launched its economic reform plan, known as Doi Moi (renovation). 
Under Doi Moi, there was a shift in the country’s foreign policy strategy.  Vietnam now 
viewed economic growth as a priority which required integration and cooperation with 
regional states and superpowers to capture foreign capital investment and technology.70  
Moreover, Vietnam became aware of the success of the “Asian Tigers” and how 
Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia and Taiwan experienced unprecedented economic 
prosperity in the 1980s.  Furthermore, Vietnam realized its longtime nemesis, China, 
began to roll out its economic plan and Hanoi did not want to fall further behind.71    
As Vietnam shifted its foreign policy in the 1980s, China continued to provide 
military aid to Cambodia and made it a major “precondition for the normalization of its 
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relations with Vietnam.”72  Hanoi realized its predicament and worked to initiate 
negotiations with China to resolve the Cambodia issue.  Vietnamese officials met with 
China privately for 2 years beginning in 1987 culminating in official talks in January and 
May of 1989 (the first since 1980).73  After several rounds of further negotiations and 
international pressure China and Vietnam agreed to allow the Cambodia conflict to be 
resolved by the United Nations.  By 1989, Vietnam was ready to trade its control of 
Cambodia for “international normalization and economic construction.”74   In April 1989, 
Vietnam announced it would withdraw all its troops by September.  
It is important to note that against the backdrop of Vietnam’s attempt to settle the 
issue of Cambodia, China’s actions in the South China Sea would raise concerns.  In 
1988 the People’s Liberation Army Navy ships sank two Vietnamese vessels in the South 
China Sea.  Beijing claimed the Vietnamese ships were harassing Chinese vessels doing 
scientific research.75  Additionally, the Chinese established a physical military presence 
on six reefs in the Spratly’s in 1988.  Unfortunately for Hanoi, this was also the time 
when Moscow and Beijing began to grow closer and put aside their disputes.  As such, 
Vietnam could not play the Russia card.  Vietnam attempted to discuss this issue through 
diplomatic channels with China, but realized it was not in a favorable position. 
Vietnam began the decade with a traditional balancing tactic to shield itself from 
the Chinese threat.  From 1980 to 1986, Vietnam enjoyed Moscow’s protection and 
attempted to form its own sphere of influence in Indo-china.  However, the Soviet 
Union’s shift in providing economic aid and its warming of relations with China caused 
Vietnam to once again bend to the will of its giant neighbor. By the end of the 1980s, 
Vietnam considered how to cooperate and pay deference to China. 
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E. 1990–1991 FULL NORMALIZATION WITH CHINA  
This section discusses Vietnam attempts to solidify diplomatic ties with China to 
gain security and economic aid.  The 1990s began with Vietnam’s attempt to settle 
disputes with China and bring itself out of international isolation.  However, Hanoi 
entered talks with a loss of credibility and prestige as Russia announced in January 1990 
that it would pull large portions of its naval and air assets out of Vietnam.76  The 
announcement further amplified Vietnam’s plight for security since it was faced with a 
“disproportionately powerful neighbor, and in order to prevent Chinese aggression, Hanoi 
had to pay deference to Beijing.”77   
Fortunately for Vietnam, China was receptive to peace and normalization.  This 
was due to the Soviets warming of relations with the PRC and Vietnam’s withdrawal 
from Cambodia.  Moreover, the PRC required stability and peace at its borders to 
concentrate on economic growth.  Vietnamese leaders held a secret meeting in September 
1990 at Chengdu, China, to discuss normalization. Vietnam informally agreed to 
cooperate with China and coordinate future foreign policy issues through Beijing.  In 
return, Hanoi was to receive an economic aid package and the two sides agreed to 
establish cross border trade.78   However, it required a year and several rounds of talks to 
officially normalize ties.   
The Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991 drew Vietnam closer to China and in order to 
seek security from the western threats.  The two communist regimes shared a common 
bond to defeat the “external threat—pressure to democratize society, allow political 
pluralism and implement international acceptable standards.”79  In November 1991, 
Vietnam and China re-established diplomatic ties.  Additionally, it was agreed that both 
                                                 
76 Amitav Acharya, “ASEAN and Asia Pacific Security:  Limits of the ASEAN Way,” “Constructing 
a Security Community in Southeast Asia:  ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order” (London:  
Routledge, 2001), 167. 
77 Vuving, “Strategy and Evolution of Vietnam’s China Policy:  A Changing Mixture of Pathways,” 
812. 
78 David Wurfel, “Between China and ASEAN:  The Dialectics of Recent Vietnamese Foreign Policy” 
Vietnamese Foreign Policy in Transition, ed. Carlyle A. Thayer and Ramses Amer  (New York, NY:  St. 
Martin’s Press, 1999), 150. 
79 Thayer, “Sino-Vietnamese Relations:  The Interplay of Ideology and National Interest,” 518. 
 24
sides would not seek hegemony in the region.80  Vietnam wanted security guarantees and 
a military alliance but China responded with “comrades but not allies.”81  Moreover, 
according to Carlyle Thayer, the summit did not provide Vietnam everything it wanted 
and issues were left unresolved such as border disputes and maritime claims.  Both 
countries agreed to hold more talks, but refrained from building permanent structures or 
exploring in areas of contention.82  Throughout the early 1990s, delegations from 
Vietnam visited China’s economic zones to study economic reforms.  However, the 
“honeymoon” period lasted only a few months.   Chapter IV will discuss Beijing’s 
actions in the Tonkin Gulf and Con Son Basin that awakened Hanoi’s historical distrust 
of China. 
F. CONCLUSION 
Vietnam’s foreign policy toward China from the 1970s to the mid-1980s was 
based on traditional balance of power.  Vietnam had first balance against the external 
threat, the United States using China.  After unification, China’s actions in the South 
China Sea, the border disputes and Beijing’s attempt to intimidate Vietnam over the 
issues of the treatment of ethnic Chinese in Vietnam would cause a shift in Hanoi’s 
foreign policy.   Vietnam later chose to lean toward the Soviet Union to counter the 
China threat and aggressive behavior.   
Against the backdrop of historical distrust and China’s actions in the 1970s, there 
were also geopolitical factors which pulled Hanoi toward Moscow.  Vietnam found itself 
in the middle of a power struggle for Southeast Asia between the Soviet Union, China 
and itself.  Hanoi used a distant superpower, Russia, to ensure its sovereignty with 
respect to China’s actions. Vietnam leaned toward Moscow for security and economic 
rewards.    However, as the Soviet Union reversed course and eventually fell from  
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superpower status, Vietnam had no choice but to cooperate with the PRC in the late 
1980s and early 1990s.  Hanoi realized that superpowers may come and go or change 
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III. VIETNAM ECONOMIC STRATEGY 
Economic growth, in turn is seen as a way to provide Vietnam with 
national security, since Vietnam is regarded as living in a region 
surrounded by tigers and a dragon; the continued backwardness of the 
country is the biggest security threat to the nation.83 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The above quote illustrates Vietnam’s plight in the mid-1980s as years of war in 
the 1950s through the 1980s with France, the United States, and China began to take a 
toll on Vietnam’s economy.  In this time period Hanoi viewed itself as a backward state 
which trailed behind its larger and more powerful historical enemy, China.  Vietnamese 
leaders believe the country had to change course and viewed economic growth as 
essential to become a strong state which could stand up to China. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine Vietnam’s economic strategy with 
regards to China economic and political ascendance in Asia.  It will assert Vietnam used 
a two prong approach to its economic strategy with China.  Hanoi engaged China to 
promote stability while using an omni-directional policy to link itself to regional 
institutions to ensure access to new markets and foreign direct investment.  The chapter 
will show that by establishing a broader in-depth economic and diplomatic relations with 
various countries, Vietnam enhances its position vis a vis China in two areas.  First, this 
strategy prevents on overdependence on China for Vietnam’s economic prosperity.  
Second, from a strategic viewpoint, Hanoi has an opportunity to utilize the economic 
linkages into diplomatic entanglement and limited security cooperation with other 
countries to ensure it can stand up to China. 
In order to provide context on Hanoi’s policy, the chapter is divided into four 
main parts.  The first portion will briefly look into Vietnam’s economic policy in the 
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1970s after unification between the North and the South.  From there, the section will 
discuss Hanoi’s economic policy in the 1980s, in particularly since 1986 and Doi Moi 
(economic renovation) when the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) began a strategy to 
transform its economy from a centrally planned system to a free market.  The next section 
will then transition into Hanoi’s economic policy with regards to China in the 1990s as 
Beijing’s economy began to expand and grow at a robust pace.  It is in this section that I 
will examine Vietnam’s economic relations with China and how Hanoi’s began efforts to 
diversify its economic linkages on the regional and global scale so that it does not 
specifically rely on Beijing for economic security.  Finally, the last portion will briefly 
look at Vietnam’s expanding economic linkages after the year 2000 with emphasis on the 
United States. 
B. VIETNAM’S ECONOMY IN THE 1970S, DEPENDENT ON RUSSIA AND 
CHINA 
In the 1970s, Vietnam first relied on China for its economic aid, but due hostilities 
with Beijing in the late 1970s, Hanoi would eventually look toward Moscow for support.  
After unification of the country in 1975, the new Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) 
attempted to unite the country and rebuild its economy which was ruined from years of 
war with the French and the United States.  The SRV launched a five-year plan to build 
its economy.  As Ton Thien states, “For Vietnam’s 1976–1980 plan, China had agreed to 
provide $1.5 billion in aid, an average of $330 million a year.”84  Moreover, in this 
period, Vietnam was also dependent on China for a wide range of support from technical 
support for roads and petroleum.85  However, all of China’s aid stopped in 1978 due to 
events at the regional and geo-strategic level.  Vietnam and China had disputes over the 
Paracel and Spratly Islands, land border tensions developed, and areas of contention 
began to surface over territorial claims in the Gulf of Tonkin.  Moreover, Vietnam’s 
relationship with Russia raised Chinese suspicion.  As a result, China eventually turned 
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off aid to Vietnam and the two countries would fight a war in 1979.  This would 
eventually lead to twelve years of hostilities. 
Due to the rift between Hanoi and Beijing, the 1976 to 1980 plan did not fully 
developed.  The SRV’s planned for an economic growth of between 13–14 percent.  
However, Hanoi fell way below this and actually achieved a dismal 0.4 percent annual 
growth.86  The economic failure had negative spillover effects such as widespread famine 
in 1978.  According to Thang, “the country suffered from persistent outbreaks of famine 
even though the government imported thousands of tons of food annually.”  Moreover, 
the country began to run up large amounts of debts and by the early 1980s, reports show 
that the debt almost equaled annual national income.87 
In conclusion, the 1970s ended with a shift in Vietnam’s Foreign Policy and a tilt 
toward Russia to balance against China’s threat.  While China was a viable partner to 
assist Vietnam, the areas of contention and Beijing’s animosity toward Vietnam would 
force the country to seek an external balancer to Russia.  In the late 1970s through mid 
1980s, Hanoi relied on Moscow for economic prosperity.   
C. VIETNAM ECONOMY 1980S, DEPENDENCE ON MOSCOW, 1980 – 1986 
AND DOI MOI  
As Vietnam Foreign Policy balanced against China’s threat using the Soviet 
Union, Hanoi became dependent on Moscow for economic support.  The SRV also 
adopted the Soviet model of economic development (centrally planned economy).   
According, in 1980, “Soviet financing of Vietnam’s Second Five-Year Plan has been 
estimated at $2.6 billion.88  Additionally, the Soviets funded various industrial projects 
which accounted for “25 percent of Vietnam’s electronic power; 85 per cent of its 
coal.”89  This was crucial source of energy because during the mid 1970s, the PRC had 
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provided Vietnam with 90 percent of its oil requirements.90  Moreover, the Eastern Block 
Nations in Europe under COMECON granted Hanoi $800 million in aid 
(Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary and East Germany).91  As Vietnam further 
integrated into Moscow’s sphere of influence, its trade and economic policies followed.   
In 1979-1980, it was estimated that 50 percent of its trade was with Moscow and more 
importantly, “90 percent of its imported steel, 90 percent of its imported oil, 77 percent of 
food, 89 per cent of fertilizers, and 94 percent of cotton came from the Soviet Union.”92 
Unfortunately, the Soviet economic model did not yield benefits for Vietnam.  
Exports reached only 88 percent of goals in 1981, the state enterprises outputs ranging 
from fabrics, clothes, paper, mats, bicycle parts and pharmaceutical products experience 
decreases and there were “severe shortages of goods” which affect the standard of living 
for Vietnamese.93 Vietnam’s failure laid in the fact the socialist planned economy and 
collectivization of agriculture took away incentives for people and additionally the 
bureaucracies were inefficient which further strained the economy.94  What further 
amplified Hanoi’s plight was its actions in Cambodia.  
Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia and a border war with China in 1979 followed 
by 12 years of border tension and hostilities with the Beijing would have negative impact 
on its economy and society.  Accordingly, “the serious economic crisis and increased 
conscription for wars in Cambodia and on the Chinese border invited strong criticism by 
the people.”95  Moreover, Vietnam was isolated in the international arena and particular, 
the “west” by the United States and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
due to its actions in Cambodia.   As a result, Vietnam did not have access to regional or 
global markets and relied solely on Moscow. 
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It is important to note that while Vietnam leaned toward Russia in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s, this era saw the origins of China’s economic reforms.  Vietnamese 
leaders looked at China’s reforms with disdain and “…viewed economic reforms as a 
deviation from the true path of socialism and repeatedly urged the population to greater 
efforts, urging them, in the words of Ho Chi Minh, to move directly from a ‘primitive 
agricultural society into a modern socialist one, bypassing the phase of capitalism.”96  As 
a result of the continue animosity with China, Vietnam began to fall further behind in 
economic development. 
1. Soviet Retrenchment and Doi Moi, 1986 
In the wake of Vietnam’s international isolation, the Soviet Union began to shift 
strategy and would eventually slow down economic aid to Vietnam in the mid 1980s.  
This caused additional strain on the government of Vietnam.  It is reported during periods 
of Soviet alliance, Hanoi’s economic assistance “accounted for 38 percent of Vietnam’s 
total annual budget.”97  In 1986 Vietnam’s Communist Party (VCP) realized international 
isolation and lack of foreign aid could jeopardize the legitimacy VCP.  
By the mid 1980s Vietnam’s economy continued to spiral downward, which had 
adverse effects on the population and government. According to Kenny, “Unemployment 
was well over 20 percent, inflation in triple digits, malnutrition widespread, poverty 
ubiquitous, starvation not unknown, and the population apathetic.”98  Actual inflation 
was measured at well over 774.7 percent.99  Moreover, Vietnam’s leaders realized the 
country was behind the region’s newly industrialized countries and that the international 
isolation due to its actions in Cambodia would not help their plight.  To illustrate, “In 
1990, Singapore had a per capita of $11,160; Malaysia was at $2,320, Thailand at $1,420; 
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the Philippines at $730, and Indonesia the most populous country in Southeast Asia, at 
$570.”100 In contrast, Vietnam’s per capita GDP was estimated at $140 by the World 
Bank.101  As a result, diminishing Soviet support and the countries economic plight, 
Vietnam launched its economic reform, Doi Moi (renovation) in 1986.  
Under Doi Moi, Vietnam attempted to transform its centrally planned economy 
into free market system.  The historic change also sought to diversify its foreign policy 
not only for security reasons but to also to build up its dismal economy.  Hanoi realized 
“…that the fate of nations would no longer be determined by arms race but instead by 
economic races…”102   Vietnamese leaders recognized the requirement to integrate into 
the world economic stage and linked itself to  powerhouses of finance and 
technology.”103  This meant that Vietnam would have to slowly integrate itself back into 
the international community.   The Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) now viewed 
economic growth as way to strengthen its position against China and its neighbors.   
The new strategy of transforming the economy would require time to build up 
institutional processes.  Under Doi Moi, Vietnam realized it required access to foreign 
capital and technology to resuscitate its economy.  The VCP viewed FDI as way to gain 
capital, technology and increase revenue for the state.104   In 1987, Vietnam passed the 
Law of Foreign Direct Investment which made it easier for the state to adopt a FDI 
strategy posture.105  In conjunction with this legal framework, Vietnam sought to sign 
and implement FDI through multilateral and bilateral agreements in the international 
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community.  However, FDI was not fully implemented until the early 1990s, due to 
Vietnam’s isolation from the west due to Cambodia. 
Cambodia was Vietnam’s Achilles heel.  Accordingly, the “…reform had been 
hampered by the occupation of Cambodia, international isolations, and hostility with 
China.”106 Vietnam would have to withdrawal from Cambodia (actually did so in 1989), 
make peace with China and work to integrate itself into the region first (Association of 
Southeast Asia Nations) and then East Asia and finally the “west” particularly the United 
States.  The next section will discuss Vietnam’s normalization with China and its 
eventual integration into ASEAN in the 1990s. 
D. ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH CHINA, ASEAN AND THE UNITED 
STATES, 1991 TO 2000 
In 1991, Vietnam and China re-established diplomatic ties and put aside 12 years 
of hostilities to promote economic growth. The communist regimes required stability and 
peace to attract foreign direct investment because regional instability would “frighten 
investors away, slow down economic growth and endanger the pursuit of economic 
reforms and consequently the internal stability of each country.”107   Moreover, in the 
wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Vietnam no longer had a “super power 
sponsor” and wanted to align with China for security and economic development.    
Vietnamese leaders were anxious to learn the Chinese model of capitalism with 
socialist characteristics.  As Li Ma states, “During the period of normalization, a 
Vietnamese delegation visited Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Nanning to observe Chinese 
reforms closely.108  Moreover in the 1990s “the two states have developed a routine of 
summit visit ever year giving the top leaders the chance to regularly discuss reform, 
opening to foreign countries, and developing the economics of both countries.”109  As 
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further testament of the close collaboration, beginning in 1991 Beijing and Hanoi signed 
over 20 agreements to facilitate trade and economic cooperation.110    
Trade between Vietnam and China began shortly after full normalization.  
Vietnam’s trade with Beijing was approximately $32 million in 1991 and by 1999 the 
trade between the two sides increased to $1.25 billion.111  However, despite the relatively 
large increase in trade there were areas of concern for Vietnam. China’s economic might 
effected Vietnam’s infant industries.  Accordingly, “Vietnam was inundated by cheaper 
Chinese products than it could produce locally.”112  These products were mainly 
“electrical appliances, hi-fi equipment, air conditioners, toys and food.”113  Vietnamese 
industries could not compete against imports from China’s large scale production 
manufacturing.  For example, George Kenny states “the village of Bat Trang along the 
Red River area of Hanoi specializes in ceramics and hopes to increase its export market, 
but its products compete with more sophisticated and mass produced ceramics of 
China.”114   
While the trade volumes increased over the 1990s, the imbalance of trade in 
China’s favor led Vietnam to implement policies indirectly to protect its industries.  For 
example, in the early 1990s, Hanoi banned 17 imports, which included, “bicycles and 
spare parts, electric fans, common light bulbs, electronics goods, thermos flask, garments 
and knitwear…”115  This list closely mirrored what China exported to Vietnam.116  
Moreover, there was a reduction of trade volumes in 1992, 1996 and 1998 due to these 
flare-ups of trade disputes.117   However, in the wake of consumer demands and 
smuggling, the tariffs were suspended.  Additionally, to amplify the problem Brantly  
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Womack stated that, “Most Vietnamese exports to China in the 1990s were raw materials 
and produce, and Vietnam was concerned about the siphoning off of its natural 
resources.”118   
By the end of the 1990s, Vietnam’s trade imbalance grew.  George Kenny states 
that by the end of the 1990s, “the imbalance in favor of China by a margin of 4.7 to 1.”119    
Vietnam attempted to mediate and discuss the issue with China to “resuscitate some of its 
labor intensive small industries.”120  For example, “in August 1999 Vietnamese deputy 
trade minister Nguyen Xuan Quang pointed out clearly, stating that there is ‘a serious 
imbalance in the two countries’ trade relations, with Vietnam suffering an increasing 
trade deficit.”121  While Hanoi raised concern of the imbalance of trade it also sought to 
diversify to prevent overdependence with China.  The next section will discuss Hanoi’s 
membership ASEAN and its economic integration with Asia and the “west.” 
1. Vietnam Economic Integration to Balance China 
Vietnam having found some shelter within ASEAN, employs a strategy 
that focuses on extending the dialogue with China, and thereby trying to 
strengthen the mutual economic ties; being economically attractive to 
other countries as well such as Russia and Japan, increases Hanoi’s 
international standing and economic strength and as a consequence, could 
provide it with the ability to assert itself politically vis-à-vis its big 
neighbor.122   
Vietnam leveraged ASEAN to slowly integrate itself into global institutions to 
increase its economic security and position against China’s economic domination.  
Economically, Vietnam required access to western markets, foreign direct investment and 
trade to become independent from China’s economic sphere.  Upon its military 
withdrawal from Cambodia, Vietnam began to develop closer diplomatic and economic 
ties with ASEAN.  As Thayer suggested, “Vietnamese history shows that one-sided 
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relations have led to political isolation and economic difficulties.... Therefore, Vietnam’s 
ASEAN membership should be achieved in a way that would strengthen instead of harm 
Vietnam’s relations with China.”123  As a result, in 1991 Hanoi launched, Vietnam’s 
Strategy for Socioeconomic Stabilization and Development Up to the Year 2000.  This 
blueprint stated Vietnam would seek to diversify its foreign policy and engage in 
multilateral forums and economic institutions.124 
By 1991, the fruits of Hanoi’s campaign to re-establish diplomatic ties with 
ASEAN had positive effects on its economy.  The withdrawal from Cambodia (1989) and 
diplomatic ties with China cleared the way for Hanoi to integrate into ASEAN.  Official 
figures released at the end of September 1991 indicated ASEAN states invested in thirty-
four projects with a total registered capital of US$173 million. This represented, “12.4 
per cent of foreign investment projects and 7.2 per cent of total legal capital invested.”125  
Additionally, ASEAN investment increased ten fold in just three years (1991–1994), and 
made up 15 per cent of total direct foreign investment. ASEAN states became involved in 
over 147 projects with a paid up capital of US$1.4 billion by the first half of 1994. 
Moreover, thirty-seven development agreements were signed between Vietnam and 
ASEAN businesses during this period.126    
Besides ASEAN, Japan and Taiwan also lead the way in providing assistance to 
Vietnam in the early 1990s.  Japan was the first industrialized country to open “full scale 
economic aid for Vietnam” in 1992.127  Additionally, Japan provided Vietnam with over 
$869 million in Overseas Development Assistance.128  Moreover, “The bulk of Japanese 
ODA money for Vietnam has been provided in the form of soft loans to finance 
infrastructure projects, and the rest in the form of grants-in-aid and technical 
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cooperation.”129  During the first half of the 1990s, “A survey undertaken among 
Japanese firms by Export-Import Bank of Japan in October 1994 ranked Vietnam as a 
number-two prospective investment market after China.”130  In short, Japan provided the 
business acumen, human and management capital to assist Vietnam to transform its 
economy and facilitate the use of FDI.131  Additionally, Taiwan began to invest in 
Vietnam and provided the influx of capital to develop its economy.  In 1996, Taiwan was 
the number one foreign investor in Vietnam.132  While Vietnam was improved its multi-
directional foreign policy and economic relations with Southeast Asia in the early 1990s, 
Hanoi would achieved another milestone in 1995. 
2. 1995 ASEAN Membership and Diplomatic Ties with the United States  
In 1995, Vietnam officially joined ASEAN not only for political and strategic 
reasons but there were economic ones too.  According to Jorn Dosch, “Vietnam viewed 
ASEAN ‘as a means to accelerate economic reform, modernization and convergence with 
this dynamic region.”133  This led to additionally economic opportunities.  First, it has 
spurred additional Foreign Direct Investment from ASEAN nations. Secondly, Vietnam 
leveraged ASEAN and delved into other international institutions to facilitate and achieve 
its goal of economic diversity.  These institutions ranged from the sub-regional ASEAN 
Investment Area and the ASEAN Industrial Cooperation to regional forums such as the 
Asian Pacific Economic Council (joined APEC 1998).134    
Regional forums allowed Hanoi policy makers access to the Asia Europe summit 
where Vietnam and other East Asian Countries have opportunities to discuss political, 
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economic and security concerns with countries from the European Union.135  In these 
multilateral forums, Vietnamese diplomats learned how to foster relationships in order to 
further enmesh Hanoi with other countries to facilitate trade and economic relations.  
Additionally, at the 8th Party VCP Congress, emphasize the importance in “the multi-
sector commodity economy.”136  This committed Vietnam’s to a strategy to further 
diversify its economy from not only primary products but to establish low cost 
manufacturing niche.   
In 1995, Vietnam established diplomatic ties with the United States.  While 
Vietnam successfully established ties with the EU, East Asia States and ASEAN, the 
“grand prize” in its diplomatic integration was the “west” and particularly the United 
States.  Prior to 1995, Vietnam ties with the U.S. increased marginally as the VCP agreed 
to cooperate with the United States on POW/MIA issues and assist with investigations in 
1992.137  This followed with small positive effects such as $3 million for humanitarian 
and telecommunications assistance packages and the opening of U.S. commerce to be 
sold in Vietnam to “meet human needs.”138  The Clinton Administration, in February of 
1994, lifted the informal U.S. trade embargo on Vietnam (it had been in place against 
North Vietnam since the 1960s). 
The most important aspect of relations with Washington was the suspension of the 
economic boycott of Vietnam and access to new markets.  This allowed Hanoi access to 
the World Bank and Inter-Monetary Fund in order to gain necessary capital, technology 
and technical assistance to improve its economy in the 1990s.  Moreover, good relations 
with Washington allowed Hanoi access to its markets.    Finally, strengthening ties with 
powers outside of Asia is what Vietnam wanted to accomplished to diversify its foreign 
policy strategy.  In the long term, Vietnam hoped to use economics as a link toward 
Washington. 
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At the end of the 1990s, Vietnam improved its standing on the world stage 
economically.  The country’s Gross Domestic Product was 7.4% in 1999 and the Hanoi 
made inroads establishing trade relations with over 100 countries.139   Yet, Vietnam had 
to continue to keep an eye on its enormous neighbor, China and how to compete with it in 
the global market.  The next section discusses briefly what ASEAN and Vietnam have in 
common with regards to China’s economic rise. 
3. Vietnam and ASEAN Economic Competition with China 
Vietnam, similar to most ASEAN countries and particular the CLMV140 countries 
are weary about China’s economic power and how it may hurt their respective 
economies.  A majority of ASEAN countries compete with China for FDI and access to 
western markets. A United States Congressional Report, China is an economic 
competitor with Vietnam “…as both compete for foreign direct investment and for 
markets in many of the same low-cost manufacturing products.”141   While figures are 
hard to come by according to Michael Glonsny, “…most studies show a clear trend of 
investment diversion from ASEAN to China since the financial crises (1997).”142  
Additionally, Vietnam and the newer ASEAN countries (CLMV) run trade deficits with 
China.   
Beijing’s reaction to the imbalance of trade and economic competition with 
ASEAN is to make routine overtures with a collaborative tone.  Chinese officials such as, 
Zhang Yunling stated, “ASEAN will become the first choice of where to invest for 
Chinese companies.”143  Other suggest as Chinese companies expand they will want “to 
locate plants closer to their markets in Southeast Asia.”144  However, critics put forward 
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the remarks from China are just empty words.  These critics argue that China only invest 
in projects which will help it secure natural resources. Glosny states that “China hopes to 
secure access to raw materials in Southeast Asia such as oil, natural gas, rubber, and tin, 
and has focused much of its FDI on projects devoted to the exploitation of natural 
resources.”145   For example, China has invested $1.2 billion in Indonesia for energy 
supplies such as natural gas. Other critics suggest, “…if low production costs continue to 
make China’s domestic environment more favorable, it is not clear why China would 
invest in ASEAN manufacturing and industrial sectors.”146   
The question is what can Vietnam do to strengthen its economic standing with 
regards to China’s continued economic growth?  How is Vietnam supposed to avoid what 
Michael Glosny calls, “colonial economic relationship”?147  Accordingly, Vietnam must 
set out and find its own market niche to avoid China’s colonial economic trap.  As 
Glosny suggest, “If the ASEAN countries do not work to increase productivity and 
develop market niches, especially as China begins to develop more high tech products, 
competition from China may leave the manufacturing capacity of ASEAN states in 
disarray and force these countries to return to the colonial situation in which they relied 
on exports of raw materials.”148   
Toward the new millennium, Vietnam trade patterns follow many other ASEAN 
states.  Primary products exported to China and low-cost manufacturing products are 
imported from Beijing.  However, Vietnam has made great strides to diversify and find 
its own markets and niches.   Collaboration with China allows for peaceful environment 
as stated but does not assist Vietnam with economic development.  Evidence suggest 
Vietnam has not received much assistance from China in terms of economic assistance.  
As Chang Pao-min noted in 1999, “It is perhaps noteworthy that Vietnam’s economic 
growth has been almost totally unrelated to any Chinese input.”149  From 1988 – 2001, 
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China ranked 26 among foreign direct investors in Vietnam (behind Canada, Bermuda 
and the Bahahamas.150 Moreover, according to Womack, “Given China’s domestic 
capital needs and opportunities, . . .China is unlikely to compete with developed countries 
in profit driven investment elsewhere, including Vietnam.”151 The next section will look 
into Vietnam’s successes and attempt to develop its economy and which countries Hanoi 
has relied on for its economic security.    
E. 2000 VIETNAM ENGAGEMENT WITH CHINA WHILE EXPANDING 
ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS 
The new millennium, Vietnam continues to engaged China and diversify its 
foreign relations and economy.  Trade has increased between Vietnam and china in less 
than 15 years:  $32 million in 1991 to $2.5 billion in 2000 and $7.2 billion in 2004.152  
However, the strategy of diversification and omni-directional foreign policy has not 
changed and according to Evelyn Goh, “Vietnam emphasizes cultivating relations with a 
range of major powers, but its motivation is more firmly the need for diversification to 
guard against external reliance, particularly in the economic area.”153    
Beijing continues to hold a large trade surplus with Hanoi and “China is the top 
exporter to Vietnam—mainly machinery, agricultural and other production materials, and 
processed petroleum products—while importing mainly primary products from 
Vietnam.154  In 2005, Vietnam’s trade deficit was $2.8 billion.155  In a visit by the PRC’s 
President, Hu Jintao the same year, “Vietnamese leaders reportedly expressed their 
concern about Vietnam’s rising trade deficit with China.”156  Despite the trade 
imbalance, both sides have agreed to expand trade and have plans to develop the 
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Kunming-Hanoi Haiphong economic corridor (between north Vietnam and southwestern 
China).  As of 2005, trade between the two countries is expected to be approximately $8 
billion annually.157  Beijing is expected to send, “…machinery, telecommunications 
equipment pharmaceuticals, fertilizer, and vehicles, while the Vietnamese export crude 
oil, coal, fish and produce to China.”158   
While Hanoi is worried about over reliance on China economically it still 
practices economic trade with Beijing while simultaneously seeks to develop and foster 
economic linkages with other countries to ensure it’s not overly dependent on China.159  
Vietnam continues to send delegations to various industrialized countries to facilitate and 
promote foreign direct investment in the country.  Accordingly, “Taking a page from 
Beijing’s playbook, Vietnam is luring makers of shoes, garments and computer chips 
with tax breaks, inexpensive land and cheaper labor.”160   As a positive step, Vietnam’s 
FDI has increased since 2003 from $2 billion to $10 billion in 2006(see Figure 1.  ). 
 
Figure 1.   FDI Registered Capital 1998 – 2006161 
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As further proof of Vietnam’s success in leveraging regional forums to link itself 
into the world economy, the chart below provides an example of the diversity of the 
countries which has filtered FDI in Vietnam.  FDI inflow has come from not only 
ASEAN countries such as Singapore but also regional countries such as Taiwan, Japan 
and South Korea.   Additionally, Vietnam has also attracted FDI from external regional 
power such as the United States and the EU (see Figure 2.  ).  
 
 
Figure 2.   FDI in Vietnam 1998 – 2005162 
While the above data illustrates the successes of Hanoi’s omni-directional foreign 
policy, its engagement strategy with the U.S. is by far the cornerstone.   As Abuza stated:    
In seeking better ties with the United States, Hanoi is hoping to attract 
massive U.S. investment and become a good trading partner.  Economic 
interdependence will thus have a two fold result.  First trade with and 
investment from the United  States will help develop the Vietnamese 
economy and thus the nations’ internal capabilities, i.e….economic 
growth can be used to finance military modernization.  Second, it hopes to 
increase its security through  interdependence with the United States.  
Simply, the United States will not sit idly by as its nationals’ investments 
are threatened.163  
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The bilateral trade agreement between Hanoi and Washington was signed in 2001.  
This allowed Vietnam to further expand trade and cooperation with the United States.  
The economic and diplomatic ties with the United States bring multiple advantages for 
Vietnam.  Analysis by Mark Manyin suggests “At the strategic level, Vietnam may be 
seeking to offset China’s increased economic, political, and cultural influence in 
Southeast Asia.”164  Economically, the United States is a vast market for Vietnam’s 
export driven economy.  Since 1994, trade between the United States and Vietnam has 
improved from $227 million to 6.279 billion dollars (see Table 1.  ). 
 
 
Table 1.   U.S.-Vietnam Merchandise Trade165 
 
Secondly, Vietnam’s aspiration was to quickly join the World Trade Organization 
and warmer ties with the United States facilitated this (Vietnam received WTO 
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membership in Jan 2007).  Other spillover affects are limited security cooperation which 
is discussed in detail in Chapter III.  Finally, as stated Hanoi wants to enmesh itself with 
a superpower to strengthen its position versus China.    
Due to Vietnam’s lack of lobbyist and political capital with the U.S., Hanoi is 
using economic engagement and the associated effects to increase its bargaining position 
with Beijing.  Accordingly, “In contrast to China, Vietnamese business has little profile 
on Capitol Hill, in part because it does not have a comparable commercial lobby. For that 
lobby to be effective, it must include (or even be led by) American companies with an 
economic stake in Vietnam. This is a potential area for cooperation between Vietnamese 
and American businesses, and more broadly between Vietnamese and their American 
supporters.”166  Since 2000, Vietnam has signed various agreements with United States 
companies to explore for oil and natural gas within its economic exclusive zones.   
1. Diversification in the new Millennium  
Vietnam continues to diversify its economy.  Besides raising the volume of 
exports of oil, agriculture (coffee, rice), seafood industry and its low manufacturing 
products (textiles, footwear and electronics), the country attempts to compete in higher 
technical jobs and skills from the “west.”  As the Wall Street Journal reported, “Foreign 
Investors and the Vietnamese government are trying to push this emerging economy up 
the learning curve, nudging it into higher tech and higher-margin business—and winning 
commerce away from better-established countries.”167   
Vietnam has moved into the “outsourcing market” from the West.  While most 
companies have capitalized on the technology and low cost talent pool from India, the 
Philippines and South Africa, Vietnam is slowly moving toward this direction.168  A 
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British Company now employs 1,500 people in Vietnam to provide billing software for 
telecom companies in Europe and develops programs to manage human resources at 
Honda Motor Co.’s British Unit and test software for the Discovery Channel and NBC 
Universal’s MSNBC.169  Another example is Panasonic Inc.  The Japanese based 
company has launched a Research and Development subsidiary, Panasonic R&D Center 
Vietnam Co., Ltd (April 2007).   According to the Japan Corporate News Network, the 
R&D center, “…will run actives relating to digital home appliances and design & 
development of software and strengthening further development capability in the global 
market from the ASEAN region.”170 As further testament to Vietnam’s potential and 
diversification, Microsoft Founder Bill Gates suggested that, “…there was no reason 
Vietnam couldn’t follow India into software development and other forms of 
outsourcing.”171   
Besides attempts of capturing high-tech outsourcing jobs from the west, studies 
suggest industrial land and labor cost are now cheaper in Vietnam than China.172  Lee 
stated that “Factory wages average $50 to $60 a month—half as much as in the 
manufacturing centers along China’s coast.”173  This could open up more doors since 
many countries have attempted to diversify their respective manufacturing base.  Vietnam 
could be seen as the alternative.   Recent animosities between China and Japan has 
shifted Tokyo’s FDI to Hanoi as a hedge against an over reliance on China. 
Besides the United States, Vietnam has increased its economic linkage with 
Japan.  This is the result of Tokyo’s historical and cultural differences with Beijing which 
“culminated again in anti-Japanese riots in April of 2005.”174  As a result, Japan is now 
diversifying its FDI and is now looking at Vietnam.  Japan’s economic investment in 
Vietnam has increased since 2000 ranking eighth and in 2005 ranking fourth.  Japanese 
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firms have targeted FDI toward Vietnam.  For example, Yamaha Motor Corporation has 
invested $48 million in Vietnam and Nippon sheet Glass Co’s set up a joint-venture with 
a domestic Vietnamese Company.175  Moreover, in 2005 Japanese invested $400 million 
in 97 new FDI projects in Vietnam.  This made Japan fourth in FDI in the country behind 
Hong Kong and South Korea.   
2. Growing Trade between Vietnam and the World  
Vietnam’s economic partners have increase at the turn of the century.  This 
further allows Hanoi to expand and deepen economic linkages so that it’s not too 
dependent on China.  In 2004 (Vietnam Major Import Export Markets, Table 2 below), 
Vietnam achieved a balanced link toward economic interdependence with the rest of the 
world.  While China is Vietnam’s leading importer, Hanoi now trades with other Asia 
countries such as Taiwan, Singapore and Japan.  The United States is now Vietnam’s 
largest export market.  Moreover, Vietnam is successful in linking its economy to other 
regions, the EU (Germany, France, Holland) and another regional power India.  
Moreover, Vietnam’s overall export trade is now almost equally divided between Asia 
and the rest of the world.  This diversity is what Vietnam has sought (see Table 2.  ). 
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Vietnam Major Export and Import Markets 
(Year: 2004, Unit: US$ million) 
Export Markets Import Markets 
Rank Country/territory Amount Country/territory Amount 
1 United States 4,992.3 China 4,456.5 
2 Japan 3,502.4 Taiwan 3,698.0 
3 China 2,735.5 Singapore 3,618.5 
4 Australia 1,821.7 Japan 3,552.6 
5 Singapore 1,370.0 Korea 3,328.4 
6 Germany 1,066.2 Thailand 1,858.1 
7 Britain 1,011.4 Malaysia 1,214.7 
8 Taiwan 905.9 United States 1,127.4 
9 Korea 603.5 Hong Kong 1,074.7 
10 Malaysia 601.1 Germany 694.3 
11 Holland 581.8 Russia 671.2 
12 France 557.0 Indonesia 662.7 
13 Philippines 498.6 Switzerland 661.9 
14 Thailand 491.0 France 617.0 
15 Indonesia 446.6 India 593.5 
Source:  Vietnam General Statistical Office  
Table 2.   Vietnam Major Export and Import Markets176 
 
 
As further evidence of the diversification of Vietnam’s economic strategy, the 
chart below illustrates Hanoi has ties not only with Asia but also Europe and North 
America. (see Figure 3.  ). 
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Figure 3.   Export Market Structure177 
 
Finally, Vietnam has diversified its commodities exports.  Although primary 
products remain the largest export of goods, Hanoi has sought to grow and expand other 
types of commodities.  Specifically, low cost manufactures goods such as computer parts, 
plastic products and apparel and textiles have increased since the turn of the millennium 
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Table: Major Exports 
Unit: US$ million  
Products Unit 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Crude oil 1000 tons 16731.6 16876.0 17142.5 19500.6 18084.0
Coal 1000 tons 4291.6 6047.3 7261.9 11624.1 17882.0
Tin Ton 2233.0 1668.0 1953.0 1817.0 N/A
Electronics, computers &
components US$ ml. 709.5 605.4 854.7 1075.4 1442.0
Plastic products “ 119.6 143.4 170.2 N/A 350.0
Cable & wire “ 181.0 187.7 291.7 389.0 520.0
Bicycle & parts “ 129.4 122.7 155.4 239.0 145.0
Luggage & flat goods “ 183.3 237.2 243.3 N/A 465.0
Footwear “ 1587.4 1875.2 2260.5 2691.6 3005.0
Apparel & textiles “ 1975.4 2732.0 3609.1 4385.6 4806.0
Cork and rattan “ 93.9 107.9 136.1 N/A 180.0
Art crafts & lacquer ware “ 34.0 51.0 59.6 N/A N/A
Ceramics “ 117.1 123.5 135.9 N/A 251.0
Hand embroidery “ 54.7 52.7 60.6 N/A  N/A
Vegetable and fruit “ 344.3 221.2 151.5 178.8 234.0
Pepper 1000 Tons 57.0 78.4 73.9 111.9 110.0
Coffee “ 931.1 722.2 749.4 974.8 885.0
Natural rubber  “ 308.1 454.8 432.3 513.3 574.0
Rice “ 3720.7 3236.2 3810.0 4059.7 5202.0
Cashew nut “ 43.6 61.9 82.2 105.1 103.0
Tea “ 67.9 77.0 58.6 99.4 89.0
Wooden furniture “ 323.7 430.8 566.8 1139.1 1517.0
Seafood US$ ml. 1816.4 2021.8 2199.6 2401.2 2741.0
Table 3.   Vietnam Major Exports178 
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F. CONCLUSION 
In the late 1970s, Vietnam’s foreign policy balanced against China and relied 
heavily on the Soviet Union for economic aid.   Unfortunately, close ties with Moscow 
did not mean economic prosperity.  In 1986, Vietnam realized with Soviet retrenchment 
that the nation was in a weak position economically compared to its neighbors (ASEAN) 
and China.  Hanoi sought to transform its economy with Doi Moi and looked to China as 
the model.   
While trade between China and Vietnam expanded in the 1990s, historical distrust 
and China’s economic rise forced Hanoi to seek its own path.   For Vietnam, “The global 
economy has seemed more attractive and less threatening to Hanoi than the possibility of 
dependence on its large neighbor.”179 As a result, Vietnam balanced against an over 
reliance on China and expanded its economic ties with regional actors in Asia and major 
external actors (U.S/EU). 
Since 2000, Hanoi has continued to strengthen its position vis-à-vis China’s 
economic and political dominance while improving its economy.  While the two states 
practice trade and cordial relations, Hanoi continues to take measures to ensure its 
independence from China.  Vietnam’s economic enmeshment with other countries allows 
it to attract foreign direct investment, capital and technology to diversify exports 
commodities.  As a result, Vietnam’s GDP growth rate in the last 15 years is second in 
the world only behind China.  This has positive effects as the per capita income has 
improved from $140 in 1990180 to $726 in 2006.181 Moreover, poverty rates have 
diminished since 1990.  Hanoi has strengthened its bargaining position versus China by 
integration into the world economic stage.  The economic linkages today provide Hanoi  
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leverage.  Vietnam can engage China with regional forums and through economic 
stakeholders (other countries) to ensure it has allies to rely on should Beijing adopt an 
aggressive posture.    
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IV. TONKIN GULF AND LAND BORDER DISPUTES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of chapter is to examine security issues in Sino-Vietnam relations to 
complement the previous chapter’s focus on economic relations.  The chapter will 
primarily focus on Vietnam’s diplomatic and political fronts of national security with 
respect to China.   It will use case studies to examine Hanoi’s strategy with regards to the 
land border and maritime disputes (Tonkin Gulf and Con Son Basin).   
The section will demonstrate that Vietnam has used a combination of economic 
engagement and diplomatic talks with a soft balancing strategy with regards to China.  
Specifically, the section will reveal that Vietnam did not use a soft balancing approach to 
its land border dispute with China in the 1990s.  However, Hanoi did use a soft balancing 
strategy to deal with China with regards to the Tonkin Gulf and Con Son Basin in the 
1990s.  Moreover, this chapter will illustrate how Vietnam continues its economic and 
diplomatic engagement strategy with China while ensuring mechanisms are in place to 
softly-balance Beijing’s influence in Southeast Asia.   
The chapter is divided into three main parts.  The first portion will discuss the 
land border disputes, and focuses on diplomacy and cross border trade.  Next, the chapter 
will discuss the Tonkin Gulf and Vietnam’s integration into ASEAN to softly balance 
China.  The last portion of the chapter will briefly discuss Hanoi’s soft balancing 
methods in 2000 to ensure it has options when dealing with its larger and more powerful 
northern neighbor, China. 
Vietnam and China officially re-established diplomatic ties in November 1991 
despite the ongoing disputes and tensions on the land border and in the Tonkin Gulf.  The 
two sides agreed to resolve the two areas of contention through diplomatic talks.182  For 
Hanoi, it had lost a superpower sponsor due to the Soviet Union’s retrenchment in 
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Southeast Asia and its eventual collapsed.  Vietnamese leaders realized the country was 
behind several Southeast Asia nations and China in economic development and quickly 
wanted peace and its northern border after twelve years of hostilities.   
B. BORDER ISSUE 
This section examines the diplomacy between the two sides first and then turns s 
to border trade.  It is important to note that while diplomatic talks were under way, the 
two sides increased trade in their border region.  The evidence illustrates that there was 
not any signs of soft balancing with regards to the land border dispute.  
1. Diplomatic Actions 
The land border dispute was solved through a series of bilateral talks from 1992- 
1999.  The crux of the disagreement was a combination of historical distrust and different 
interpretations of the Franco-Chinese border demarcation agreement in the late 1800s 
along the 1,350 kilometer border.183  The initial hurdle was to move past historical 
animosity between the two sides, most notably the recent flare-up of the 1979 border war 
which led to claims by Vietnam that China moved the respective border markers to 
increase territory.184  Of note, the Friendship Pass area was a contentious issue.  Hanoi 
claimed Beijing moved the border 300 meters inside Vietnam’s territory.185  While this 
appears small, history plays a role.  Vietnamese sometimes referred to Friendship Pass as 
the, “Conquering Barbarian Pass and Conquering South Pass.”186   According to 
Tempest, “This was the traditional route for invading Chinese armies.  No other place 
better symbolizes the long-standing enmity between China and Vietnam, which has never 
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forgiven 1,000 years of Chinese rule that ended in 939 AD.”187   Moreover, the border 
war in 1979 led to a few towns and villages with conflicting claims, such as the areas 
between Guangxi (China) and Lang Son (Vietnam).188  Additionally, there were 333 
border markers planted in the early 1900s but after years of neglect there were areas in 
disagreement.   Finally, to add to the task, Amer stated, “Reaching an agreement was by 
no means simple, given the geography of the border areas which encompassed not only 
mountainous terrain which are not easily accessible but also rivers.”189   
Vietnam and China agreed to a three tier approach to resolve the issue.  The 
negotiations ranged from a “Series of expert level talks, government-level talks (at 
deputy/vice ministers; foreign minister levels) and high-level talks (at secretary-general 
of CCP and CPV, President and Prime Minister Level).”190    In 1994 there was progress 
as, “…both sides agreed in principle to observe the boundaries set in an 1897 treaty 
signed between the Qing Dynasty and the French colonial government in Vietnam.”191  
The Vietnamese specifically claimed there was approximately 236 areas on the border 
which China crossed the original 1897. 192   
Eventually, through continued bilateral talks and pressure from high level 
government officials both sides made small strides.  In 1996, both sides agreed to re-
establish rail service between Guangxi, China to Long Son, Vietnam.193  This 
incremental step allowed the countries to slowly build trust.  According to Amer, “The 
re-opening of the railway in February 1996 stands out as the most significant 
achievement in managing bilateral relations and increasing cooperation without formally 
resolving the territorial disputes.”194   
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The rail service progress was followed by a summit between Vietnam’s 
Communist Party Leader, Do Moui and China’s leader, Jiang Zemin in 1997.  At this 
meeting both agreed to solve the land border issue by 2000.195  As a further sign of 
progress and diplomatic goodwill, the PLA announced completed the removal of 
approximately 2.2 million land mines around the border region in 1999 (actual worked 
started in the mid 1990s).196  Moreover, a compromise was reached over the 300 meter 
dispute over Friendship Gate.  The border was moved 148 meters north of the line China 
claimed which satisfied the both sides.197   
By early 1999, the two sides reached consensus on 900 kilometers of the 1,350 
kilometer common border.  The remaining 450 kilometers in disagreement were divided 
into three areas:  Type A, B and C.  The type A and B disputes ranged from different 
viewpoints, interpretation of maps and past treaties.198  The remaining disagreements 
were narrowed down to 227 square kilometers and the differences ranged from 
“…conflicting historical maps, current management and control, current or recent 
occupancy, terrain definition, and international law.”199   Eventually the 227 square miles 
were divided and China received 114 square kilometers and 113 square kilometers went 
to Vietnam.200  Finally, the Land Border Treaty was signed on December 30, 1999 and in 
2000 both states ratified it.201   
The diplomatic process was a slow and arduous effort from both sides.  The two 
countries had to juggle areas of contention with historical animosity.  I believe the border 
trade and economic linkages helped the two sides settle the land border issue.  The next 
section will look at the economic trade at the border during the 1990s.   
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2. Economic Trade at the Border in the 1990s 
The single most important economic reality of normal border relations is 
trade.  Without trade, a border region suffers the disadvantages of being on 
the edge of a closed national economy. With it, location becomes an 
advantage and the border region becomes the most convenient place to 
buy and sell goods with the neighboring country.202 
Vietnam and China required stability and peace at the border region to promote 
economic growth.  The above quote above illustrates the advantage of cooperation for 
both sides upon normalization and the official restart of border trade in 1991.  Before the 
reopening of border trade, the border regions of Vietnam and China were not developed.  
According to Xiansong and Womack, the area was “primitive” and “Transportation, post 
and telecommunications infrastructure was underdeveloped, as was the degree of 
municipal administration.”203  Additionally, from a holistic view, in the early 1990s, the 
two countries not only shared the same plight at the border but as Li Ma states, “The two 
countries, in fact realized that their common situation brought with it common interest, 
i.e., some identical problems and short-term objectives.  Among those was the necessity 
for sustainable economic growth, foreign direct investments, and regional stability.”204   
The opening of the border trade facilitated economic growth and diplomatic 
agreements from both sides despite an undercurrent of historical distrust.  In February 
1992, the Friendship Pass border-crossing allowed trucks to pass through for the first 
time since 1979.205  This was significant because Vietnam and China still had issues 
concerning the location of the border marker at the pass. However, while this was a 
positive step, Kathy Wilhem noted the Vietnamese, “…off the record, officials speak 
bluntly about their fears of China.  They note that the United States fought in Vietnam 
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less than two decades, but China occupied it for more than 1,000 years and repeatedly 
invaded after being driven out in the year 938.”206  However, despite the historical 
animosity, in 1992, both sides passed laws at the national and provincial levels to make it 
easier to facilitate border trade between their respective provinces.207  Specifically, the 
agreements facilitated economic engagement between China’s southern provinces, 
Guanxi and Yunnan, population approximately 88 million and Vietnam’s northern 
provinces with a population of approximately four million.208   
Economic cooperation and trade had synergistic effects for both countries.  First, 
it facilitated mutual cooperation to promote trade and efficiency.  Economic cooperation 
districts appeared along the border cities of both states.  These areas served as the hub for 
“…the accumulation and distribution of goods, as well as for trade and information 
exchange.”209 Eventually, in search of further efficiency both countries developed and 
linked transportation networks (rail, bridges and highways) to increase trade.  For 
example, a bridge was built from Dongxing, China crossing over the Beilun River to 
Vietnam.210   Highways were made more efficient and expanded to isolated regions.  
Moreover, both sides of the border experienced an increase in construction of new 
facilities, electric power and telephone services. Additionally, the liberalization of 
economic trade promoted increase interaction between the countries in terms of tourism.   
Tourism was non-existent in the 1980s, but statistics revealed from 1993 to 1998, there 
were over 12 million people who crossed the border between Vietnam and China.211    
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China estimated that Vietnamese tourist had an economic impact of 745 million yuan.212  
Overall both states experience mutual gains.  The next section will look at each state 
individually. 
The effect of the border trade was mainly positive for China and largely positive 
for Vietnam with a few negative side effects. While the total Chinese trade with Vietnam 
in the 1990s was fairly small, it was important to China’s southern provinces.  Due to 
their geographic location, these provinces did not have a chance to participate in 
economic reforms until full normalization with Vietnam.  Guangxi is a good example of 
how trade benefited China.  Accordingly, by 1991, “…the border trade was two-thirds of 
the provinces’ official trade with Hong Kong and more than Guangxi’s combined trade 
with Japan, the United States, Germany, Singapore and France…”213  Another important 
statistics is “…Guangxi Province saw the value of its total trade with Vietnam increase 
rapidly from 450 million yuan in 1988 to 2.6 billion yuan in 1992, an almost six-fold 
jump.”214  Additionally, from a logistical perspective, China’s southwestern provinces 
gained the use of Vietnam’s Haiphong port to ship commerce versus going through 
Canton.215 
For Vietnam the border trade meant it could open up its economy and sell 
resources such as coal, rubber, agriculture and other primary products to China.  
Additionally, new trade routes opened up and exposed communities to increase traffic.  
According to Wilhelm in the mid 1990s, “All along the mountainous border, towns and 
villages remote from other trade routes are achieving new prosperity from trading with 
China.”216  Through increase economic trade, studies suggested that the quality of life in 
Vietnam improved.   As Womack states, “On the Vietnamese side, field survey data 
comparing 1990 figures with those of 1993 show that 54% of families in the border areas 
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of northern Vietnam had raised their standard of living, 31% remained at existing  
levels, and only 15% experienced declines.”217   
The negative impact for Vietnam was its manufacturing community could not 
compete with Chinese made products.  Womack stated, “The import of Chinese 
consumer and light production goods has eased a severe shortage, especially in northern 
Vietnam, but also overwhelmed local production.”218  To protect its domestic production, 
Hanoi attempted to ban 17 different products and raise tariffs on imports from China 
from 1992 to mid 1993.219  However, this protectionist measured did not work as the 
consumers of Vietnam were hurt by this strategy.  Moreover, higher tariffs by Vietnam 
led to more smuggling, which at time became a source of contention between the two 
sides.  According to Womack, had Vietnam continued to raise tariffs and control imports 
it would require additional law enforcement at the border which would “…harm the 
general tone of relations with China.”220  Also, Vietnam in the early 1990s was in no 
position to “…practice effective unilateral control of the border.”221  As a result, Vietnam 
opted to continue with free trade and decided the positives of economic liberalization 
outweighed the negatives.   
Overlapping national interest in economic development on both sides facilitated 
diplomatic talks to resolve the border dispute.  As Sveinung noted, the border trade 
assisted both countries political leaders because they claimed the economic strategy 
benefited all regions within their respective countries.222  Moreover, as Womack stated in 
the 1990s, “Within the general Chinese-Vietnamese interest relationship, the border trade 
is likely to play a stabilizing role as the major expression of a shared material interest in 
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cooperation.”223  This is evident as bilateral trade between the two countries increased 
from $32 million in 1991 to 1.25 billion in 1997.224    
In conclusion, the actions between Vietnam and China concerning the Land 
Border disputes and the eventual treaty remained bi-lateral as both sides did not involved 
outside countries or organizations.  There was no soft balancing by Hanoi.  The Tonkin 
Gulf and Con Son Basin is a different story. 
C. TONKIN GULF AND CON SON BASIN 
This section is divided into three areas.  The first section provides at brief 
background of the Tonkin Gulf and Con San Basin.  The second section will illustrate 
how China’s actions in the South China Sea which accelerated Vietnam’s immersion into 
ASEAN.  From there, I will provide evidence on Vietnam’s soft balancing approach to 
ensure a level playing field with China.   
1. Background 
Vietnam is sensitive to issues in and around the South China Sea since much of 
the country’s 3,260km coastline and economic exclusive zone borders it, most notably 
the Tonkin Gulf and Con Son Basin.  The areas of tensions were amplified in the 1990s 
due to contested interpretation of economic exclusive zones and which nation had rights 
to exploit the natural resources within the respective waters (oil/natural gas and fisheries).  
China estimated the Tonkin Gulf area may have “…one of the biggest oil and gas 
concentrations in the world, with oil deposits estimated at 2.29 billion tons and natural 
gas deposits of 1,444 billion cubic meters.”225  Additionally, both countries rely on the 
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gulf for maritime transport and the fishery resources.  Scientist estimated the 
“…sustainable catch in the Gulf is 600,000 tonnes per year.”226   
Vietnam and China required over eight years (1992 – 2000) of formal and 
informal talks to agree on a resolution to the delimitation in the Gulf of Tonkin.  There 
were over 60 different meetings which ranged from the joint working group, mapping 
groups and three at the government level.227  At first the two countries could not even 
reach consensus on what to call the Gulf.  Beijing called the gulf Nan Hai (South Sea), 
and Hanoi called the area Bien Dong (East Sea).  This clearly reflected the countries 
geographic perspectives and nationalistic views.228  The common thread for both 
countries was to resolve the issue peacefully through negotiations to ensure stability and 
economic growth. 
The dilemma was what to use for a starting point, the Sino-French Treaty or the 
UN Law of the Sea?  Eventually, the two sides agree to use the UN Law of the Sea which 
stipulates states have the right to exclusive economic zones of 200 nautical miles of their 
respective coast.  However, the Tonkin Gulf is approximately 176 nautical miles at its 
widest point so there was obviously overlapping claims.229  This led to several small 
naval clashes over exploration of oil, natural gas and fishing rights in the 1990s.230   
Through diplomatic talks, the two states reach an accord.  On December 25, 2000 
Vietnam and China signed an agreement on the delimitation of the Tonkin Gulf and 
Fishery Cooperation.  The agreement settled the issue of sea boundaries, exclusive 
economic zones, and the continental shelves.  Under the agreement Vietnam received 
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53.23% and China 46.77% of the gulf area.231  The diplomatic efforts from both 
countries settled the dispute.  But, Hanoi had to use a soft balancing strategy (diplomatic 
entanglement and limited security arrangement) to ensure a fair deal.  Events in the Con 
Son Basin led Vietnam to adopt a soft balancing approach in 1990s with respect to the 
Tonkin Gulf. 
Vietnam views the Con Son Basin as vital to the sovereignty and economic 
development.  The sea area is located off the coast of southern Vietnam. Hanoi started to 
exploit the area out to 200 miles for oil since the late 1980s with various foreign 
companies.232  The sea area is in close proximity to the Spratly Islands which have 
overlapping claims from numerous ASEAN states, (to include Vietnam and China) over 
ownership of the Spratly Islands. Moreover, the area is “…dangerously close to an 
extension of China’s infamous nine dotted lines that demarcate its claims in the South 
China Sea.”233  It is the Con Son Basin that awakened Vietnam’s historical distrust of 
China.   
2. China’s Action in the Tonkin Gulf and Con Son Basin 
In February 1992, Beijing announced its Territorial Water Law which stated the 
South China Sea Islands were claimed by China and that it could use force to remove 
anyone who infringed on its sovereignty.234   In May 1992, China followed this up with 
granting rights to Crestone (U.S. company) to explore for oil in an area which Vietnam 
claimed as part of its continent shelf, in the Con Son Basin.  The area was 600 miles 
away from Hainan Island, China’s closest undisputed territory.235  Additionally, what 
made matters worse, Crestone’s President Randal Thompson suggested to reporters that 
China would use its navy to protect Crestone against any aggression from other 
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countries.236  Further successive actions by Beijing in and around the TonkinGolf/Con 
Son Basin within a short timeframe caused additional concern were:   1) China landed 
troops and planted a territorial marker on Dac Lac Reef in the Spratlys.237 (1992)  2)  
China built a drilling platform in a disputed area in the Gulf of Tonkin (1992) and 
impounded Vietnamese ships out of Hong Kong which Beijing claimed carried goods to 
Vietnam to be smuggled into China (1992).238  3) May 1993, Chinese drillings ships 
again encroached on Vietnam’s territorial waters.239  All of these events occurred as talks 
began on the Land Border and Demarcation of the Tonkin Gulf.   
3. Vietnam’s Diplomatic Strategy—Multilateral Engagement  
Vietnam found itself concerned about China’s actions but without an ally to 
balance against China, Hanoi tried quiet diplomacy with China while it slowly engaged 
ASEAN to counter China. Vietnam signed the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Concord in 
1992.240  By doing so, Vietnam reverted back to history and as David Wurfel stated, 
“Fear and distrust of China must surely be the most important emotional foundation of 
Vietnamese foreign policy, a feeling much older than the ideological camaraderie of the 
1950 and 1960s—the revival of which in 1991 was so short lived.”241  Moreover, 
interviews with Vietnamese officials in 1993, suggested Hanoi believed Beijing had a 
South China Sea strategy.242  As a result of China’s aggressive actions, Vietnamese 
officials contemplated their options as:  
There are three possible ways or organizing our relations with China:  1) 
confrontation  2)  satellite status similar to North Korea or 3)  median 
position between the two.  Satellite status provides no guarantees.  North 
Korea was sacrificed by China when it turned to South Korea.  Also, even 
if Vietnam were to be a good satellite, China would not leave us alone.  
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They will always pressure us and try to dominate Southeast Asia.  We 
tried for a full year to forge new relations with China but we failed.  Take 
its occupation of Bay Tu Chinh (a reef in the Spratly archipelago) and the 
Crestone affair.  Okay, we distrusted China but it was only with Bay Tu 
Chinh that we understand that China follows its national interest.  That 
game in the nature of international politics.243 
Vietnam adopted a hybrid approach of cooperation with Beijing and 
“diversification and multi-directionalization” at the 1992 Seventh Party Congress.244  As 
one Vietnamese foreign ministry official stated the plan was that, “Sino-Vietnam 
relations will be meshed within the much larger regional network of interlocking 
economic and political interest.  It is an arrangement whereby anybody wanting to violate 
Vietnam’s sovereignty would be violating the interest of other countries as well.”245  As 
such, Vietnam stepped up efforts to enmesh itself into regional forums and the 
international community.  As Okabe states one of the main goal for Vietnam’s ASEAN 
membership was to counter the China threat in the South China Sea because several 
ASEAN states shared Vietnam’s concern about China’s activities in the area.246 The new 
strategy of “engagement” with the world through the use of multi-directional or omni-
directional foreign policy would show results in 1995. 
Vietnam’s foreign policy campaigns of multilateral engagement to softly balance 
China achieved several milestones in 1995.  Vietnam became a member of ASEAN and 
established diplomatic ties with the United States and the European Union.  ASEAN 
membership allowed Vietnam a way to re-establish diplomatic ties with individual states 
in Asia.  It also served as a strategic safety net that Vietnam could leverage to mitigate 
direct confrontation with China over disputes.247  Moreover Dosch suggest, “Vietnam’s 
accession to ASEAN meant that the Association now grouped all of China’s adversaries 
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in the conflict about overlapping territorial claims in the South China Sea.”248 The 
milestones also provided Hanoi a way to slowly gain contact and establish access to the 
west and most notably its markets via the United States.  It also provided Vietnamese 
leaders an opportunity to learn the rules and nuances of the international and diplomatic 
arenas. Vietnam lacked experience with the international community after years of war 
and isolation.  Finally, diplomatic ties allowed Hanoi to facilitate dialogue on economic 
and limited security programs which it required to improve its socio-economic situation 
and position vis a vis China.  
Vietnam re-established ties with the United States not only opened up diplomatic 
and economic doors to the west, it also had other strategic affects.  While the Vietnamese 
are not likely to publicly admit the role of United States in its security,  Nayan Chanda, 
deputy editor of the Far Eastern Economic Review, reported, “in April 1995 a well-
informed Vietnamese opined that the government is counting on…eventual strategic ties 
with the U.S. to counter the threat from a resurgent China.”249  The key for Vietnam was 
how to reap the benefits of multilateral engagement while maintaining cordial relations 
with China. 
After 1995, Hanoi pursued a two track foreign policy strategy.  First, it continued 
to facilitate cooperation and dialogue with China to maintain stability and attract foreign 
direct investment from various countries and regions (ASEAN states, U.S., Japan, EU).  
Secondly, Vietnam enhanced its “bargaining” position with China through the use of 
multilateral forums and bilateral relations.  As Jorn Dosch states, “To some extent, 
Vietnam’s ASEAN membership partly transformed bilateral Sino-Vietnamese disputes 
into a multilateral agenda involving China and ASEAN as a group.”250  Two events 
illustrate how Vietnam used multilateral diplomacy to balance against China.   
 
                                                 
248 Dosch, “Vietnam’s ASEAN Membership Revisited,” 250.   
249 Okabe, “Coping with China,” 130. 
250 Dosch, “Vietnam’s ASEAN Membership Revisited,” 244.   
 67
4. Soft Balancing through Limited Security Cooperation and Diplomatic 
Entanglement  
Vietnam and the Philippines collaborated to form a limited security agreement in 
the wake of Beijing’s action in the South China Sea.  In 1995, China built a platform and 
occupied Mischief Reef, a feature in the Spratly Islands which was well within the 
Philippines exclusive economic zone.  The Philippines were upset with the lack of 
response from ASEAN.  A year later (1996), Hanoi and Manila signed a “Memorandum 
of Understanding on Joint Oceanographic and Marine Scientific research in the South 
China Sea.”251  The first “joint” research was accomplished near Mischief Reef.   
Additionally, in 1997 defense officials from the Philippines and Vietnam met to discuss 
further cooperation.  This is an example of how Vietnam learned to cooperate with other 
countries that had competing interest in the South China Sea.  Vietnamese policy makers 
realized they could use bilateral engagement to diplomatically and indirectly stand up to 
softly balance China’s action.  
Vietnam learned how to engage regional forums to balance against China in 1997.  
This diplomatic entanglement allowed Vietnam to softly balance China.  According to 
Vuving, “On  March 7, 1997, China sent the mobile oil platform Kantan-III and two pilot 
ships to conduct exploratory oil drilling in the Tonkin Gulf, in an area that Vietnam 
claimed was within its exclusive economic zone (EEZ).”252  This occurred despite the 
fact the two sides reached an accord in 1993 which stated both parties would not explore 
for oil in areas of contention until an official agreement was reached.253  One Vietnamese 
diplomat stated, “This action had added another example that the Chinese expansionist 
policy has remained unchanged.”254  Vietnam attempted to use backdoor channels to 
solve the issue with Beijing.  But after stalled negations, Vietnam went public.  It also 
called the ASEAN ambassadors and said , “if China behave this way to Vietnam, it could 
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behave the same way towards (them).”255   As a result, in April China withdrew its vessel 
from the area.  Vietnam had played the ASEAN hand, but did not want the press to throw 
it in the face and embarrass China.256   
Furthermore evidence of soft-balancing in the realm of “limited security 
arrangements” is also evident in the Kantan III incident.  The Chinese incursion into 
Vietnam’s EEZ overlapped with Admiral Prueher, Commander-In-Chief, United States 
Pacific Command visit to Hanoi for talks on POW/MIA and military to military 
discussions.257  Admiral Prueher’s presence certainty had an affect on the incident, as 
Vuving states: 
On March 22, during the row with China, the commander of U.S. forces in 
the Pacific, Joseph Pruher went to Hanoi, becoming the highest U.S. 
military official to visit Vietnam since normalization.  These activities 
soon yielded fruit. On April 1, China withdrew its vessels from the 
disputed area and agreed to resolve the problem through consultation with 
Hanoi.258 
Moreover, it was during the Prueher visit that the U.S. and Vietnam would show 
signs of a closer “limited security arrangements.”  The United States invited senior 
Vietnamese military officers to the Asian-Pacific Center for Security Studies in 
Hawaii.259  Moreover, “Prueher suggested equipment exchanges or sales, tactical 
discussions and joint training exchanges in jungle warfare.”260  While these discussions 
in the 1990s were at the infancy level, it opened the door for further collaboration in the 
2000s. 
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The 1990s was a change from the past for Vietnam.  In the decade, Vietnam 
realized that “small and medium powers within the region, if banded together in a 
vigorous regional organization, may also have a role to play in dealing with China.”261 
This soft balancing approach through regional forums provides Vietnam with options 
(diplomatic, economic) in coping with China versus traditional balancing acts which 
stipulated military alliances.  Additionally, throughout the 1990s, Vietnam expanded its 
omni-directional foreign policy and harvested close ties with each ASEAN member 
states, the European Union, Japan, India, Taiwan and the United States.  Since Vietnam’s 
membership in ASEAN in 1995, it has established diplomatic relations with over 160 
nations and trade relations with over 100 countries.262  It also joined APEC in 1998 
further integrating itself within Asia’s economic sphere.  All of these actions may have 
“spillover” effects in terms of economic cooperation and security issues which could 
assist Hanoi with options to balance China. 
It is also important to note that while Vietnam did branch out in its foreign policy, 
Hanoi did reach an accord on the Land Border and Tonkin Gulf as well as the 16 World 
Guidelines with China.  Through diplomatic and economic engagement, Vietnam did 
ensure contentious issues did not get out of hand in the 1990s.  It leveraged ASEAN to 
increase its bargaining position with the PRC. 
D. SOFT BALANCING IN 2000:  LIMITED SECURITY COOPERATION 
AND DIPLOMATIC ENTANGLEMENT 
In the new millennium, Vietnam continues to engage China through economic 
cooperation and diplomatic talks but also uses soft-balancing techniques to hedge against 
China.  This section will illustrate Hanoi has used two characteristics of the soft 
balancing strategy with regards to China:  security cooperation just short of formal 
alliance and diplomatic maneuvering to frustrate an opponent.   
As stated, Vietnam and China signed treaties concerning the Land Border and the 
Tonkin Gulf.  Since the treaties, the two sides have enhanced economic cooperation and 
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cross border trade.  China and Vietnam implemented plans for an economic corridor 
linking northern Vietnam with southern China.  Moreover, the two sides continued to 
discuss the actual planting of border makers in 2004.  In the Tonkin Gulf, the two sides 
officially ratified the Delimitation Treaty and Fishing Cooperation Treaty in 2004.263  
Moreover, they have exchanged verification and implementation procedures.  
Additionally, both sides have established procedures for joint naval patrols in the Tonkin 
Gulf.264  As for the Con Son Basin, there remain disputes on the EEZ and which country 
will able to exploit the natural resources due to various claims to the Spratly Islands.   
1. Limited Security Cooperation 
Vietnam has continued to seek security cooperation with a wide range of nations 
since 1990s and 2000.  As Thayer stated in 2005, Hanoi since 1990 opened up defense 
dialogue with 60 countries.265  Moreover, “In the period from 1990-2004, Vietnam has 
exchanged over 266 high-level defense visits with 40 countries, including thirty at 
ministerial level.”266 The effects were signed defense cooperation agreements with 
various states ranging from the EU (Germany/Italy) to South Korea.267  This has 
transpired into 32 foreign naval ships visits to Vietnam from 15 different countries since 
1990 to include the United Kingdom and Australia.268  While the above security 
cooperation schemes are with middle-tier level states, Vietnam has increased its security 
cooperation with the world’s remaining superpower, the United States. 
Hanoi has slowly gained closer ties with the Washington in the new decade.  In 
the late 1990s and early 2000s, visits continued from senior defense officials from both 
nations.  The tangible effects occurred in 2003, as the U.S.S. Vandergrift and 200 
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military personnel visited Vietnam’s Ho Chi Minh City (formerly Saigon).  This was the 
first visit by a US Navy warship since the Vietnam War ended.269  As former United 
States Ambassador to Vietnam, Raymond Burghardt said: 
Vietnamese officials commented to us that these events would be high 
profile: Vietnamese people and Vietnam’s neighbors would immediately 
understand that the U.S.S. Vandergrift steaming up the Saigon River 
symbolized a significant improvement in bi-lateral ties.270 
Moreover, Burghardt stated in 2005 that “Over the past two years, Vietnamese 
officials and think tank experts have expressed regular concern over China’s rapidly 
deepening ties with Cambodia, Laos, Burma and Thailand.”271  As a way to counter and 
balance China, Burghardt also indicated, “In private and even some semi-public 
meetings, authoritative Vietnamese officials specifically raised the Chinese angle in their 
newfound enthusiasm for the US.”272  As a result, cooperation increased with regards to 
expanding international military education and training of Vietnamese military officers in 
the United States and a joint counter-narcotics training session with U.S. federal agencies 
and Vietnam in 2004. 273  Additionally, an indication of warmer relations is at the 
invitation of United States Pacific Command, Vietnam’s deputy chief of defense attended 
the Asia-Pacific Chiefs of Defense Conference in Japan, 2004. 274 Also, there have been 
two other U.S. Naval ship visits to Vietnam.  Finally, there continues to be high-level 
visits between senior defense leaders from Vietnam and the United States such as 
Rumsfeld’s visit to Hanoi in June 2006.   
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2. Diplomatic Entanglement 
Evidence of diplomatic soft balancing occurred within ASEAN and prior to the 
first East Asian Summit (EAS) in December 2005.  It has two facets, exclusion of outside 
states in Asia (India, New Zealand and Australia) and blocking United States attendance.  
Vietnam agreed with Japan that the United States should be invited. However, China 
sought to exclude the United States.  Apparently, Vietnam sided with Japan and raised 
their opposition behind closed doors but did not to want to challenge China in public.275  
While Hanoi lost the small diplomatic issue (US did not attend), it was successful in 
another one.  China quietly sought to exclude India, New Zealand and Australia from the 
summit, but Vietnam, Indonesia and Singapore pushed for their attendance.276  While the 
United States did not attend the EAS, according to Pham, “There is every reason to 
believe that Vietnamese leaders believe that their national interests can be better secured 
through an at least tacit strategic partnership with the offshore United States than in 
succumbing to the aspiring onshore hegemon next door.”277 
E. CONCLUSION 
Vietnam’s foreign policy strategy with China concerning the land border disputes 
is closely linked to overlapping national interest--economic.  Hanoi has not used a soft 
balancing strategy to deal with issues concerning the land border disputes.  The two 
countries realize that economic trade facilitates cooperation and further promotes 
economic growth in cross border trade.   
In the South China Sea, particularly the Tonkin Gulf, Vietnam used an 
engagement strategy to discuss the issue of overlapping claims with China while it 
simultaneously established diplomatic ties with ASEAN and outside state actors.  
Because China has more power (economic, diplomatic standing, military) than Vietnam, 
Hanoi sought to link itself into regional forums to counter the China threat.  The soft 
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balancing techniques of entangling diplomacy and limited security cooperation served 
Hanoi well because symmetrically, China has more aggregate power.  Soft balancing 
allowed Vietnam to circuitously challenge China to ensure a level playing. 
Since 2000, Hanoi has followed a dual track strategy of economic engagement 
and talks with Beijing while simultaneously linking itself within regional forums and 
fostering tacit security arrangements with various countries to include the United States.  
These soft balancing strategies allow Vietnam to leverage existing regional forums to 
challenge China indirectly through diplomatic entanglement while also ensuring limited 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Vietnam’s foreign policy toward China has evolved over three decades.  It has 
changed from traditional balancing act to a hybrid approach of engagement and soft 
balancing. In the 1970s, Vietnam practiced traditional balancing acts to ensure its 
independence.  It sided with Russia and China to ensure its independence from the United 
States.  Toward the end of the 1970s, China’s actions in the South China Sea, the land 
border and its coercive military actions toward Vietnam’s internal affairs concerning 
ethnic Chinese would awaken historical distrust.   By the end of the 1970s, Vietnam 
leveraged Russia to balance against the China threat.  Hanoi’s ambition to control 
Southeast Asia combined with its invasion of Cambodia would have negative effects.  
Vietnam was isolated from the international community and relied solely on Moscow’s 
assistance for military and economic aid.    
In the mid 1980s, Hanoi’s economy was in ruins due to the failure of the Soviet 
economic model and its occupation of Cambodia.  Inflation rates were triple digits and 
Vietnam’s leaders realized the nation was in dire straits.  The VCP realized it had to 
change course and seek economic development to strengthen its position against China.  
Additionally, what amplified Vietnam’s plight was the Soviet Union’s reversed course 
and policy of peaceful relations with China.  This shift would see Vietnam’s aid from the 
Soviet Union diminish and Moscow’s eventual collapse from superpower status left 
Vietnam without a “sponsor.”  Vietnam had little choice but to cooperate with the China 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s.   Hanoi realized that it had to slowly integrate itself 
into the world economy and international stage.  This meant it had to withdraw from 
Cambodia, make peace with China and then slowly establish diplomatic and economic 
linkages with Southeast Asia countries and the world.  At the end of the 1980s, Vietnam 
realized it could not put all its eggs in one basket and rely on support from just one 
country or superpower.  Hanoi learned that superpowers may come and go or change 
their priorities, but China is always next door to Vietnam.   
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In the early 1990s, Vietnam and China shared a common purpose of stability and 
peace to promote economic growth.  The two sides agreed to cooperate and solve 
lingering issues such as the land border and maritime disputes through diplomatic efforts.  
However, China’s actions in the Con Son Basin and Tonkin Gulf forced Vietnam to  
diversify its foreign relations with other countries and integrate into regional forums.  
While Vietnam continued to engage China it also was able to softly balance against 
Beijing’s actions leveraging ASEAN.  Throughout the 1990s, Vietnam cooperated with 
China in terms of economic trade and diplomatic talks to solve contentious issues.  
However, it “softly balanced” against China’s aggression through omni-directional 
foreign policy.  As evident in the Kantann III affair, Hanoi was able to play the ASEAN 
card to balance China’s aggressive posture. This dual strategy allowed Hanoi to 
cooperate with China and also establish links to various countries within Southeast Asia 
and outside state actors through diplomacy, limited security arrangements and economic 
interdependence.  This strategy allowed Vietnam to leverage multilateral and regional 
forums to enhance its bargaining position versus China.    
Most recently, Vietnam’s foreign policy strategy toward China is to use soft 
balancing techniques (diplomatic entanglement and limited security cooperation) along 
with diplomatic and economic engagement.  Vietnam continues routine diplomatic 
contacts with China to facilitate stability and economic trade.  However, it 
simultaneously works to increase its ties with other state actors and regional forums to 
prevent overdependence on China.  This strategy of enmeshing Vietnam into regional 
organizations and economic interest of nations has provided options to counter the China 
threat.  Moreover, scholars suggest that a traditional balance of power tactic in dealing 
with China would only antagonize it.278   As such, Vietnam has learned to refrain from 
this approach and sought to use soft balancing tactics and multilateral approaches to 
engage China.     
The United States must realize that Vietnam has learned traditional balancing acts 
against China with outside regional actors have negative impacts.  From Hanoi’s 
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perspective, superpowers come and go or even change their priorities or national interest, 
but China remains.  As such, Vietnam cooperates with China to ensure stability and 
economic prosperity.  However, historical memory and aggressive Chinese actions cause 
Vietnam to seek alternatives to ensure its sovereignty.   
Vietnam does not want to rely on a single superpower again.  It has sought to 
diversify its foreign relations and economic linkages to ensure it has various options to 
deal with its powerful neighbor, China.  It continues to link itself into regional and 
international forums to leverage these institutions as a force multiplier indirectly against 
China should it feel threatened.  Additionally, should regional forums and institutions 
fail, Hanoi continues to expand limited security arrangements with various states as a 
hedge against outright Chinese aggression.  While these arrangements are small in scope 
and short of a formal military alliance, they provide options should China take an 
aggressive posture.   
The U.S. strategy toward Vietnam should be a three-part approach.  First, the 
United States must engage Vietnam within the framework of regional forums and 
institutions.  Hanoi uses the respective forums to softly balance and challenge China’s 
dominance in Asia.  Second, economic engagement with Vietnam must continue.  While 
Vietnam’s economy continues to grow at a robust pace it still requires foreign direct 
investment and access to Western markets for economic prosperity. Additionally, 
Vietnam is also a viable alternate manufacturing base for the United States should 
relations with China go wrong.  As for military related issues, Washington must realize 
that Vietnam does not entirely trust China but cannot afford to be seen as the cornerstone 
in a U.S. containment strategy against China.  As such, the United States should continue 
to expand limited security arrangements with Vietnam.  These can range from small scale 
military operations (U.S. Navy ship visits, IMET training) to collaboration on 
transnational issues such as piracy, humanitarian assistance and terrorism.  These actions 
will facilitate confidence building measures between the two countries without raising 
too many eyebrows from Beijing.  The United States already performs many of these 
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